Lessons for India from Russia’s ineffective military performance

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine There have been many effects, but one area that deserves more attention is whether it has produced enough impacts to change our understanding of war. An overview of the evidence shows that there has been no significant change in the nature of the war. However, there are some key facts that have implications for the Indian Army, which uses a significant amount of Russian-origin weapon systems.

three claims

There are at least three claims made by supporters that the conflict marked the beginning of a turnaround in the war. The first is that the battle tank has been rendered obsolete, because of the highly effective performance of anti-tank missiles such as the American-made Javelin or advanced anti-tank weapon systems, which have inflicted destruction on Russian T-90s. But the tanks have faced past obituaries. Immediately after World War I, which saw the emergence of the battle tank, particularly in Britain, there were voices announcing the death of the tank, as it could not punch through German defenses. This conclusion proved to be misleading as the Germans saw considerable merit in the tank and employed it to disastrous effect as a blitzkrieg in World War II. Fundamentally, on a tactical level, for a tank to be effective it required the use of infantry in close support of armored operations. As in previous wars in which tank losses occurred, it is still absent in Russia’s strategy, which explains why the Russians have suffered so many heavy tank losses. As a standalone capability, the tank offers the benefits of a trinity of elements – firepower, maneuverability and protection. No weapon platform can serve as a reliable substitute for ground operations.

The second claim is that emerging technologies such as cyber and digital technology, artificial intelligence, remotely operated systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles, and space-borne capabilities have rendered legacy platforms such as fighters, warships, and artillery weapons obsolete. Emerging technologies cannot be a substitute for legacy platforms; They can enhance their performance as best they can. If accurate firepower is to be provided against adversarial targets, the legacy system would be crucial for the launch of the ordnance. Emerging technologies may enable better command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, helping to optimize situational awareness, from detecting threats for commanders to reducing decision times for responding to them. and enhance the sensor for shooter capabilities. The catastrophic losses inflicted by Russian ground forces from drone and anti-tank attacks operating in battalion tactical groups, consisting largely of armor and artillery units and small infantry, have convinced supporters that the nature of the war has changed. . Infantry plays a vital role in providing protection to any advancing tank columns and in retaliate when they are in danger. It doesn’t initiate a change in combat, it’s just bad strategy.

In the end, the failure of the Russians to apply air power effectively thwarted the invasion from the start. This has convinced supporters that air power is not consequential. In fact, the suppression of enemy air defense should be the foremost requirement of any attacking force. Russia’s failure to neutralize Ukraine’s air defenses remains a clear weakness. Active Ukrainian air defense has forced the Russians to revise their military objectives and limit their military operations to the Donbass and the Black Sea coast.

The Russian invasion left long lines of communications and military columns that could not be supplied and reinforced. This left them exposed to deadly interference by Ukrainian forces. One consequence of this is low morale among Russian soldiers including large numbers of recruits and poor command. Military effectiveness is critically a function of the army’s morale and command ability. These two important variables have little to do with technology or logistics.

significant achievements

The main route for India from Russia’s ineffective military performance is to invest more in sensors, electronic warfare, greater digitization, satellite communications and unmanned systems, not only for reconnaissance and surveillance, but also attack missions. For this there is a need not to abolish old forums, but to make them more lethal and effective. India will also need more missile forces to enhance its offensive capability. The Indian Armed Forces will need to be proficient in combined arms warfare. No amount of advanced technology can replace or compensate for low morale and training, weak command, poor strategy and tactics.

Harsh V. Pant is the Vice President, Studies and Foreign Policy, Observer Research Foundation (ORF); Karthik Bommakanti is a Fellow of the Strategic Studies Program, ORF