New Delhi should note that Taiwan’s close economic ties with China have not prevented Taipei from asserting its rights.
New Delhi should note that Taiwan’s close economic ties with China have not prevented Taipei from asserting its rights.
Abbreviation United States House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, against the stern warnings issued by China, has the potential to aggravate already deteriorating relations between the US and China, with major implications for Taiwan. For China, its claims about a rising superpower may be hollow if it is unable to unify its claimed territories, particularly Taiwan. For America, it is about re-establishing the steadily eroding American credibility in the eyes of its friends and foes. For Taiwan, it is about standing up to Chinese bully and for Beijing to clear its red lines. The crisis that began with Ms Pelosi’s visit to Taipei is still unfolding and today there is little clarity about how it will end, even if a full-scale invasion of Taiwan or a war between China and China is unlikely. Is. We
For those of us in India watching the happenings around Taiwan, there are valuable lessons to be learned. To begin, consider this. A tiny island of 23 million people has decided to stand up to one of the strongest military and economic powers on the planet, facing the consequences of survival. India is a far more powerful nation with nuclear weapons and a standing army of 1.4 million, against which China has only marginal territorial claims. And yet India is hesitant to bluff China.
To be fair, there is a growing recognition in New Delhi that it is important to face the challenge presented by a belligerent China, but there appears to be a lack of clarity on how to meet this challenge. To that extent, the Taiwan crisis offers at least three lessons to New Delhi.
clear message
The most important lesson from the Taiwan standoff for policymakers in New Delhi is the importance of articulating red lines and sovereign positions in a clear manner. New Delhi needs to clearly highlight the threat from China and the sources of such danger. In the absence of such clarity, as we have already seen, Beijing will use tact to push Indian borders. More pertinently, Beijing, like all others, analyzes Indian responses to the standoff at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in 2020, realizing that New Delhi’s response to a rather entrenched expression of the Chinese aggression two years earlier. A major reason behind is domestic politics. Calculation.
To date, India’s leadership has not clarified to the country what exactly happened at the border in 2020 and whether China’s illegal occupation of Indian territory continues. When domestic political calculations prevent India’s leaders from acknowledging China’s threat, it provides a veil of ambiguity for Beijing to pursue its territorial claims. face to face India.
Furthermore, Chinese Psy-Ops will continue to exploit the absence of a national situation in India or a narrative about the threat posed by China. Worse, the vague message by India also confuses its friends in the international community: if India does not explicitly state that China has illegally occupied its territory, it will seek diplomatic advice from its friends in the international community. How can one hope to support India, either form or otherwise? In other words, India’s current policy of ‘hide-and-seek’ face to face China is a bad sender, and confuses its own people as well as the larger international community, and is therefore counterproductive.
appeasement is bad strategy
By avoiding Ms Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, or perhaps keeping it less important, Taiwan could have avoided the ongoing confrontation and economic blockade during Chinese retaliatory military exercises around its territory. Instead, it decided to kick off the visit with high-profile meetings and statements from a full public view, making it clear to China that it was not willing to back down from its stated goals, whatever the consequences. China’s appeasement, Taiwan knows, is not the answer to Beijing’s aggression.
China today is a revisionist power challenging the regional order; is intent on using force to fulfill its strategic objectives, and is inclined to reshape the territorial balance of power to suit its interests. With this kind of power, appeasement may work in the short term, but it will have the opposite effect in the long run. If so, we may be guilty of playing in Chinese hands by making four mistakes in India.
First, India’s policy of meeting/hosting Chinese leaders, while the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to violate established territorial norms on the LAC (d) is a deeply flawed one. Recall the standoffs at Demchok and Chumar during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in 2014, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to India again earlier this year, even as Chinese troops remain under occupation. Indian Territory. While one could argue that diplomacy should continue despite problems on the border, in reality such diplomacy by Beijing runs the risk of being seen as an example of India’s consent despite provocations.
The second mistake is to unilaterally fulfill the sensitivity of China even during the standoff between the two armies. For example, parliamentary delegation visits and legislature-level dialogue between India and Taiwan have not taken place since 2017, which coincided with the Doklam standoff that year. Why bother respecting Chinese political sensibilities around Taiwan or Tibet, when it is illegally occupying Indian territory, and wants more territory from India?
The third mistake was the soft-pedaling of the quad (Australia, Japan, India and the United States) when China objected to it. During the 2000s, India (as well as Australia) decided to soft-pedal the quad in the face of strong objections from China. It is only in the last two years that we have seen renewed enthusiasm around the Quad. In retrospect, appeasing Beijing by almost abandoning the Quad was a bad strategy.
Perhaps the biggest mistake India has made is the non-acceptance of PLA’s infiltration into Indian territory in 2020 and the annexation and occupation of Indian territory along the LAC since then. Let us be clear: unwillingness to accept China’s illegal occupation of Indian territory along the LAC, for whatever reason, amounts to a misguided appeasement strategy that must end.
flawed reasoning
It is often argued that the growing economic and trade ties between India and China are reason enough to ensure that tensions between the two sides do not escalate, and that both sides should find ways to coexist peacefully. While this appears to be a sound argument, I present that argument in a slightly different way: Are economic ties enough for India to ignore the frequent Chinese incursions along the LAC and continue to negotiate territorial agreements? In other words, given that economic relations are a two-way process and, in fact, the trade deficit is in China’s favour, China also has a lot to lose from the damaged trade ties with India. Moreover, if Taiwan’s example (as well as the India-China standoff in 2020) is anything to go by, trade can continue despite tensions and without any compromise by India. face to face its sovereign claims.
editorial | An avoidable crisis: Nancy Pelosi on a trip to Taiwan
Consider this. Mainland China is Taiwan’s largest trading partner, and China has an annual trade deficit of approximately $80 billion to $130 billion with Taiwan. In addition, there was an investment of $198.3 billion from Taiwan to China by 2021, while investment from mainland China to Taiwan was only $2.5 billion from 2009 to 2021. In other words, Taiwan knows that, given the economic interdependence between the two sides, despite the saber-annoyance by Beijing, it is unlikely for China to stop trade with Taiwan, after all, on semiconductors mass-produced in Taiwan. is dependent.
In other words, close economic ties with China have not prevented Taiwan from asserting its rights or backing down from threats from China. So, should India, a large economy and a military power, be concerned about economic ties with China under pressure from China? India should trade with China, but not on China’s terms.
Happyman Jacob is Associate Professor, Center for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.