Libyans gather at Martyrs’ Square in Tripoli, February 17, 2023, as they mark the 12th anniversary of the uprising that overthrew longtime strongman Muammar Gaddafi. , photo credit: AFP
heyOn February 17, Libyans celebrated 12 years of the uprising ended the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, The streets were decorated with flags and lights, with musical performances and military parades, reflecting the popular joy in Tripoli. Some even believed that the political nightmare that has plagued the country for a decade could end with national elections this year.
This may be wishful thinking. Last year, on February 10, Libya had the dubious distinction of having two prime ministers – marking the culmination of the binaries that have defined the war-torn country since the fall of Gaddafi.
Since 2014, there are two centers of power in Libya – the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli which claims executive authority, and the House of Representatives (HOR) in Tobruk which exercises legislative powers. Tripoli controls the northwest of the country, which includes the cities of Tripoli and Misrata, while Tobruk controls the east and south.
In February 2022, the HOR announced that the term of office of Abdul Hamid Dabibah, the current Prime Minister who headed the Government of National Unity (GNU), had expired and Former Interior Minister Fathi Bashaga appointed in his place. But Mr. Dabiba refused to give up his position, forcing Mr. Bashaga to operate from the city of Sirte. In July and August, a frustrated Mr. Bashga launched a military assault on Tripoli to drive out his rival, but was not successful.
Most Libyan politicians have amassed extraordinary wealth: While the economy, fueled by oil revenues, is expected to grow 18% this year, a third of Libyans live below the poverty line. A former UN Special Representative described the situation as a “redistributive kleptocracy”.
foreign competitions
The ideological competition around the place of political Islam, represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, which took place in the early days of the Arab Spring, resonated strongly in Libya after Gaddafi’s departure. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members Qatar and the UAE supported rival factions in the civil conflict – Qatar supported the Islamist government in Tripoli, while the UAE, supported by Egypt, supported the HOR in Tobruk.
From 2014, the UAE backed Libyan strongman General Khalifa Haftar in order to achieve a military settlement, which enabled him to bring the eastern and southern regions of Libya under his control. From April 2019, he launched a major attack on Tripoli. The United Arab Emirates supported the offensive with hundreds of drone strikes, weapons and jet fuel, and funded Sudanese and Russian mercenaries as part of its forces.
The invasion failed with the entry of Turkey. In November 2019, Turkey signed an agreement with the crisis-hit Tripoli administration and provided it with drones, air defense systems and mercenaries from pro-Turkish militia groups in Syria. Mr. Haftar was forced to retreat back east.
Recently a new plan to break the political impasse has come to the fore. On 28 February, Abdoulaye Bathily, the United Nations Special Representative for Libya, said he would set up a “high-level steering panel”, noting the “major legitimacy crisis” and widespread popular frustration in the country. It will bring together relevant stakeholders who will adopt a legal framework for elections, address matters related to the code of conduct and election security, and prepare a time-bound road map for elections to be held within this year.
Outlook
However, there is widespread skepticism about the success of this initiative. The HOR in Tobruk has rejected this on the grounds that it is its prerogative to establish a dialogue committee and that it will not work with foreign parties. Others have noted that Mr. Bathili has not given any details of the composition of the selection panel and that such plans have gone nowhere in the past.
The role of outside players is expected to be significant, although there is much uncertainty about their currency. In a dramatic move, the UAE has abandoned its earlier support for the Tobruk administration and reached out to Mr Dabibah in Tripoli. To ingratiate himself with his new sponsors, Mr. Dabibah has not included Islamists in his government and has offered the UAE contracts obtained in the Gaddafi period in energy, construction and telecommunications. The United Arab Emirates has forged close ties with Mr. Dabibah’s interior minister and even with some militant groups.
Qatar, on its part, has increasingly distanced itself from Tripoli and has pushed for Tobruk, building ties with Haftar and his sons and other officials from earlier anti-Gaddafi groups and members of the HOR. Qatar has also maintained ties with Mr. Bashga, who is backed by Libyan Islamists. Since October last year, Qatar-Egypt relations have softened, ironically, with Qatar being seen as an influential player in Cairo to play down the Islamist challenge from Tripoli.
Turkey has renounced its affiliation with political Islam and forged ties with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt; But it maintains an aggressive posture in the eastern Mediterranean. Russia, with mercenaries from the Wagner Group, is embroiled in Libya, viewing the oil-rich country as a valuable base for expanding its influence in Africa.
Libyan politicians affiliated with diverse foreign groups ensure that there is no initiative that would unite their country and give its people a democratic system and a greater share of national wealth. Indeed, there are credible possibilities of a re-emergence of military conflict.
Talmeez Ahmed is a former diplomat