10 jawans and a civilian were killed in an attack allegedly by Maoists on the road in Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada district. , photo credit: AFP
heyOn April 26, 10 District Reserve Guard (DRG) personnel and a civilian driver were killed in a blast caused by an improvised explosive device (IED) planted by Maoists near Aranpur village in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh. The blast happened some six months before assembly elections, and amid claims by the government that Maoist insurgency has subsided. The DRG personnel were returning in a van after conducting an anti-Maoist operation based on a tip off that it could be a trap. The IED was planted under the paved surface of the road. It is unclear whether it was deployed the night before the attack or months earlier, when the road was under construction.
Message
While it is a fact that the Maoists have been on the backfoot for some time now, it would be a mistake to dismiss their ability to strike at will, especially in their strongholds. The hartal on 26 April cannot be the brainchild of any local Maoist unit; There is a high probability that this was a trap laid under the instructions of the Maoist Central Committee, indicating the continuing hierarchy of the Maoists. The primary objective appears to be the message of ‘sustained control’ by the guerrillas.
The attack, like many previous attacks by the banned group, was carried out during the tactical counter-offensive campaign – the period between February and June every year when Maoists carry out maximum attacks against security forces. Of the total 17 major attacks in Chhattisgarh (2010-2023), two were carried out in February, four in March, six in April, two in May and one each in June, November and December. The data clearly points to a pattern that should give enough clues to the government to plan its strategy. Most importantly, during the months of strategic counter-operation, the security forces should be extra vigilant by strictly following the standard operating procedures and protocols, which seem to have been blatantly violated during the unfortunate strike on 26 April.
It is widely accepted that effective policing in militancy-affected areas is a function of a strong state police force, and that central police forces should complement state police rather than supplant them. As per the Bureau of Police Research and Development data, there are many vacancies in the state police forces. As on January 1, 2021, the share of vacancies in state police cadres in Left Wing Extremism affected states was 24.41%, which adversely affects the police-population ratio. Hopefully this number has improved over the years. Without a comprehensive transformation of the state police, the central forces would achieve little more than random and sometimes ‘wrongful killings’.
Certain aspects are overlooked in the context of providing employment to local tribal youth for DRGs. First, local youth, when armed, often gain a false sense of empowerment and enter into conflict with the Maoists. Such militancy is due to familiarity with Maoists belonging to the same ecosystem. During the April 26 incident, the DRG’s intelligence network was outflanked by the Maoists. Second, the DRG needs to be employed in a controlled manner by the state police. Security should not be outsourced to them only. In this case the DRG personnel acted independently, exposing their ad hoc planning. Third, although the combat-worthiness of the DRG is beyond doubt, it is not complemented by the rigor of discipline, an essential quality for soldiers in any prolonged counter-insurgency operation. The track record of the DRG with regard to discipline is not very encouraging, several cadres have been cashiered on disciplinary grounds and some have been found to be involved in crime.
permanent solution
The scope of Maoists is continuously shrinking. However, it would be an exercise in complacency to take the incident as an act of desperation. Getting deep into the roots of this festering wound will be the key to success. This incident calls for deep reflection on the disenfranchisement and disenfranchisement of the tribal people of central India, who are the most deprived citizens in every way. The government also needs to pay adequate attention to perception management. An example of this is the extensive road construction projects in Bastar. The government says that these projects will increase the reach of security forces instead of making life easier for the local population. This sends the wrong message. Also, the futility of the Maoist ideology has not been sufficiently exposed in the present times to weaken the militancy. No doubt security is necessary along with development, but the focus should go beyond security and development.