In this 1998 file photo, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Defense Minister George Fernandes, Chief Scientific Advisor to the Prime Minister APJ Abdul Kalam and Head of the Department of Atomic Energy R.K. Chidambaram displays the victory sign during Shakti 1’s visit. The test site where India tested nuclear devices at Pokhran a week ago. , Photo Credit: AP
TeaGodi-Five years ago, on 11 and 13 May 1998, India had created a new future for itself. No other event has done more for India’s self-esteem and its place in the world than the fall of Dacca in 1971, and no other policy decision has had more implications for its national security. Over the past two decades, the military aspects of India’s nuclear policy and program were shrouded in obscurity and opacity. Little reliable information has been available since May 18, 1974, the day India conducted its first nuclear test and dubbed it a “peaceful nuclear explosion”.
On May 11, 1998, the curtain finally rose. After conducting three underground tests at Pokhran, followed by two more on 13 May, the Indian government was unusually forthright in its statements. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was clear: “Our intentions were, are and will always be peaceful but we do not wish to cloak our actions with a veil of unnecessary ambiguity. India is now a nuclear weapons state…”
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Result
The 1998 tests sparked an outbreak of events and brought India into perhaps its worst ever confrontation with the United States. On 13 May, Washington imposed sanctions against New Delhi under the Glenn Amendment; Pakistan had conducted several nuclear tests on 28 and 30 May., And China saw India as showing “blatant contempt for the common will of the international community”. Domestically, the Congress and the Left criticized the test decision.
But in 2023, it is clear that the nuclear tests reflected a moment of profound enlightenment: an awakening of India’s self-confidence and an awareness of its potential. India’s status, security and ability to influence the international system received arguably the biggest boost since Independence, and undoubtedly the strongest boost since the end of the Cold War.
removing the three assumptions
Furthermore, the denuclearization of India, subsequent events, and declassified sources dispelled, if not destroyed, the three beliefs. First, that the decision to conduct the test was taken by the BJP government, ignoring public opinion. While the Vajpayee government may have decided to conduct the test, almost every prime minister since independence has been “imprisoned” in the development of India’s nuclear weapons programme. Even Jawaharlal Nehru, whose commitment to disarmament is considered impregnable, was conscious of the potential security benefits of India’s nuclear program. He argued that by not developing steam power and thus missing out on the Industrial Revolution, India had become a slave country and therefore should develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes. But he added, “Of course, if we as a nation are compelled to use it for other purposes, probably no pious feeling will prevent the nation from using it in that way.”
Following nuclear tests by China at the Lop Nor test site in 1964, during Lal Bahadur Shastri’s prime ministership, Homi Bhabha, considered the ‘father of India’s nuclear programme’, was given the green light to pursue India’s nuclear weapons option. Got the flag. , and a small group was established to study underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.
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It is well known that Indira Gandhi had approved the first nuclear test in May 1974. Although it was called a “peaceful nuclear explosion”, Raja Ramanna, the architect of the test, revealed that it was a weapon that had been tested. Few people know that in 1988-89, Rajiv Gandhi gave the go-ahead to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Defense Research and Development Organization to build an Indian nuclear deterrent. By 1990, India had a fully developed nuclear weapons programme, which was approved by every subsequent prime minister. However, the Vajpayee government must take credit for the historic tests of strength.
The second myth was that India would be isolated and its economy would be burdened by sanctions and international humiliation. However, beginning with a dialogue between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbot, it became clear that democratic India, with its flawless non-proliferation record, was too big and important to marginalise. Instead, the US, treating it as an exceptional case, took the first steps to bring India into the mainstream, which culminated in the Indo-US civil nuclear deal in 2005.
The third was the ethnic myth spread by Western nonproliferation absolutists that India and South Asia could not be “trusted” to manage nuclear weapons, and the logic of deterrence that prevented a major war between the Soviet Union and the US Will not apply to the subcontinent. Indeed, whether it is in the context of a well-thought-out nuclear doctrine, the C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) structures required to manage nuclear weapons, deterrence and escalation ladder, and ensure flexibility of response India, the US and the Soviet Union have far more sophisticated means than 25 years after they acquired nuclear weapons. Not only at the strategic or conventional level, but also at the sub-conventional level, deterrence has worked well in South Asia.
Ukraine, which gave up nuclear weapons, is facing nuclear threats and ‘blackmail’ from Russia, India should celebrate the wisdom and foresight of its leaders (political and scientific) who refused to surrender under pressure and helped develop a reliable nuclear deterrent against the fierce. odds.