Political impetus for populism can degrade India’s democracy

For people in the four constituencies where taxi drivers determine election results, the entry of Ola and Uber hurts. For other Goans, it promises profit. Prospect theory holds that the effect of a loss is twice as powerful as that of a gain in the same amount. This meant that if the government had cracked down on taxi drivers, the next election would have been a single-issue election in those four constituencies. But for the general public to support the government on its stand, it would have been a multi-issue election, with the entry of Ola and Uber being just one of them, and Parrikar knew it. As a result, voters in those four constituencies, united by a grievance, held the state for ransom. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, in his 2017 book Skin in the Game: Hidden Asymmetries in Daily Life, calls it the dictatorship of a minority.

The scenario also explains the difference between populism and reform in the public policy space. Populist leaders are not those who serve the needs of a numerical majority; They serve the needs of a cohesive numerical minority, whose interests are consolidated enough to dominate the scattered and divergent interests of the majority. The ongoing protests against India’s agricultural laws reflect this phenomenon. A handful of farmers who do not represent the country’s farming community have forced the government to postpone the implementation of agricultural reforms that benefit every citizen in general and other farmers in particular. Supporting these protesting farmers and their short-term interests is populism. The same was the case with the opposition to the Land Acquisition Bill lying in cold storage. Reform-oriented leaders are those who support and insist on policy measures that address the hidden needs of the numerical majority, a need they sometimes do not even appreciate.

About 60% of India’s population was born after 1991, and so they don’t know what it means to live under a license system. But, in 1991, even among Indians who did not have an alternative economic world view, there was a latent need for change, choice and growth. Despite opposition from crony capitalists, socialist politicians and vocal minorities with other vested interests, the then Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao initiated economic reforms. Had Rao sought the support of the general public of India to implement those reforms, he would hardly have got any. But one consequence of the policy change was the spread of long-term economic benefits even to sections that opposed or were indifferent to the reforms. It is a tragedy that 30 years after adopting measures that lifted an estimated 200 million Indians out of poverty, Rao remains a cripple across the political spectrum.

Reform is the only way through which development can be institutionalised. But against every reform, there will be a vocal minority determined to stop the process as the voice of the majority. Unfortunately, democracy has a political incentive to support such short-sighted and selfish interest groups, making reforms difficult. As explained by game theory, the difficulty is compounded when the democracy in question is as diverse as India’s.

The nature of the choice that voters have in a democratic system is similar to the prisoner’s dilemma game in which players are faced with two choices: one that will benefit the individuals little, but collectively they are better off if everyone else uses that choice as well. make use of; and a choice that will benefit individuals more, but at the expense of others, and if everyone exercises this option, the collective outcome is worse for everyone (this lock-in is called Nash equilibrium). In a democratic system characterized by immediate interests, which tend to be at cross objectives, anecdotal evidence suggests that citizens exercise choices mostly out of self-interest. When everyone else does, the result is an inefficient and inefficient governance system with little appetite or vision for reform. It is, therefore, no surprise that the political trajectory of some of India’s leading politicians began for populist reasons.

In contrast, the career development of a politician in China is not through elections by the people but through performance appraisals by political higher-ups. The assessment is based on economic reforms and development, where the voice of any dictatorial minority is not good for the larger population. As a result, there is a healthy disdain for populism in the Chinese governance system. No Chinese politician can oppose rising fuel prices or land acquisition to set up factories in his province.

Democracy, although referred to as “the will of the people”, often represents the will of assertive special interests. On every issue, the demands of numerical minority groups prevail. Therefore, in this age of hyper-media, politicians in democratic societies are increasingly being encouraged to respond to populist demands. In societies such as China, the political system encourages politicians to avoid populism. This is a fundamental feature that not only sets the two countries apart, but also explains why reforms are the norm under the Chinese political system while they are an exception in the Indian system. In its current form, our democracy is failing us. Is.

Prasanna Karthik is a governance strategy and public policy professional. He served as policy advisor to former Goa Chief Minister Manohar Parrikar. These are the personal views of the author.