An initial though superficial view at the start of the Covid pandemic two years ago would have suggested that closed pairs around the world would lead to a global baby boom. In reality, the story has been quite mixed, with baby busts appearing in many parts of the world and pregnancy booms in others.
In the US, parts of Western Europe and China, the data suggest a pattern of births that have placed these countries not only on a path to their long-declining birth rates, but also on an accelerating trend in a significant way. Is. This trend appears to have increased in the Nordic countries and the Netherlands. In emerging markets such as India and the Philippines, pregnancy booms have occurred, but whether or not this has resulted in a baby boom is partly a function of the availability of cheap and safe abortions.
The first rigorous economics-based work on fertility was by Nobel laureate Gary Baker in 1960. The most important phenomenon that needed clarification at the time was the large and persistent decline in fertility rates during a period of economic and demographic change. After the Industrial Revolution.
Since that time, as economies around the world have become more prosperous, their fertility rates have declined. As a result of this negative income-fertility relationship, the fertility rate in the developed world has fallen from 5 in 1850 to 2 or less today. Among newly prosperous countries, South Korea has dropped from less than 10 births per 1,000 people to less than 5 years old today, which is less than Japan or Singapore. On this metric, the US stands at about 11, and India’s rate has dropped from about 45 births per 1,000 people at the time of independence in 1947 to about 17 now.
Baker proposed a “quantity-quality” trade-off in childbearing, where parents would “invest” in their children, primarily through education, and this investment would lead to a higher income and standard of living for the next generation. will pay with Another reason for declining fertility rates is the opportunity cost for women. In the last century, as more women were employed and their wages caught up with that of men, this phenomenon came into play. While these effects are still ongoing in developing countries such as India, we are at an early stage in what appears to be a secular reversal—or, if not a reversal, reduction in fertility rates, at least in affluent countries. Surprisingly, some high-income-per-capita countries, such as the US and Norway, today have higher fertility rates than less affluent countries such as Spain. An excellent new working paper (#29948) from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) that brings us up to date on academic arguments presents an evolved preference-based model for fertility.
Enter the pandemic: There are two opposite effects going on. On the one hand, less availability of comfort, proximity and contraceptive methods will result in more children being born naturally. On the other hand, couples will choose to postpone pregnancies as a result of the uncertainty caused by the pandemic, both emotionally and financially. A distorting factor has been the legality, accessibility and safety of abortion. Broadly speaking, the world has resolved itself during the pandemic with a baby bust (due to the uncertainty factor), a baby boom (led by proximity and mitigation of uncertainty), or a pregnancy boom where the actual Birth has been limited by abortion. For example, one explanation given for the boom in Norway is a belief in the protection provided by the welfare state. The data is still preliminary, and some effects may be transient, while others may be more permanent.
India’s demographic transformation is continuing at a rapid pace. Since the country’s 2011 census, there has been a decline from about 22 to 17 per 1,000 births. About 24 million babies were born in 2020 (India is adding one Australia per year), this figure is still increasing every year but at a decreasing rate. India’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is slowly falling and is now at 2.16, possibly lower. As per the 2019 Sample Registration System, 13 states and 2 union territories are now at replacement fertility rate or less. On this trend, India’s population will peak around the time of ‘India@100’ years of independence and then decrease significantly at the end of this century.
India’s slowly maturing demographic profile presents challenges and opportunities. The solid support that our working-age population provides to the rest of society in their thirties and forties (“thirties”) is still bankable for the next 20 years.
At first glance, the shock of the pandemic has not affected our demographic profile dramatically. More figures will complete this picture in the coming years. In the absence of Census data for 2021, analysts estimate that there are around 138 million people over the age of 60 in India (highly affected by Covid deaths), and this is expected to increase to around 200 million by the time of the next census. .
So, for a period of decades, India will be both a ‘young’ and an ‘old’ country. This would mean that we should focus on issues of youth, education and employment, as well as issues of health of the elderly, care of the elderly and pensions. This bar-belling of requirements will require efficient political navigation.
PS “Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity,” said the Roman philosopher Seneca.
Narayana Ramachandran is the chairman of Include Labs. Read Narayan’s mint column at www.livemint.com/avisiblehand