It has too many things on its agenda, and with the announcement of Aukus, it faces the threat of becoming a talk shop.
Coming up on the eve of the first Individual Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) summit in Washington DC, the new Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) trilateral security partnership is sending a subtle message to the Quad: shape up or become irrelevant. AUKUS’s announcement and the recent outcome of the Quad summit indicate that AUKUS will move to create a major security regime of the Indo-Pacific region, potentially causing the Quad to retreat into the background in a struggle for attention, political will will be forced. , and resources. But before we get to the implications of AUKUS on Quad, let us briefly examine how AUKUS is useful for Quad.
assurance to colleagues
The way the United States withdrew its forces from Afghanistan, resulting in a humanitarian disaster, is still under intense international criticism, with AUKUS expressing US President Joe Biden’s commitment to American allies, especially in the Indo-Pacific. wants to signal.
In some ways, AUKUS helps reassure its allies of America’s security commitments and underscores Washington’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific. Second, the deal, and in particular the sharing of US nuclear submarine technology with Australia, would help Canberra overcome past hesitations about taking on China with more conviction. Third, despite the fact that AUKUS may sound alarm bells for the Quad, AUKUS is still a shot in the arm for the larger Indo-Pacific agenda, with India, the US, Japan, Australia, among other key partners. In other words, AUKUS will support the Quad’s stated objective of keeping the Indo-Pacific region free, open and inclusive, thereby contributing to its core agenda.
No replacement, but…
AUKUS cannot replace the Quad and yet it appears that AUKUS has ventured where the Quad has been reluctant to enter military territory. Furthermore, AUKUS also highlights the Quad’s inherent, self-imposed, limitations, that is, its incompetence and lack of willingness to give itself any military role. The focus of the recently held Washington summit on challenges ranging from COVID-19 to climate suggests that the Quad is unlikely to take a security-oriented turn; That’s exactly the vacuum AUKUS wants to fill.
The big question, then, is whether the Quad is losing its steam. Certainly, the Quad serves no clear purpose, as a result, too many items get added to the agenda. It has no secretariat, no charter like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and no clear set of activities like aucas. The Quad’s ever-growing list of focal areas will eventually make it a less than useful discussion forum.
In other words, with too many items on its agenda, Quad faces the danger of becoming a talk shop with very little real work. Ironically, all members of the Quad have security/military considerations in mind face to face China is attached to the Quad platform, but no one is keen to build it in a way that is mentioned in the summit joint statement (North Korea and Myanmar, not China). There is no interest in properly institutionalizing the Quad nor has the objective of ‘Quad Plus’ been pursued purposefully.
Let me put it a little differently: Indo-Pacific remains a grand strategic vision, AUKUS has the potential to become a major military/security system in the Indo-Pacific, and Quad/Quad Plus a talk shop within the Indo-Pacific Can be made. – Pacific.
New Delhi’s hesitation
New Delhi has taken the stand that “there is no connection between the AUKUS and the Quad” as argued earlier that there is no connection between the Malabar naval exercise and the Quad, even though the Quad membership is reiterated in the Malabar exercise and the AUKUS Two-thirds of the quad is 50% of the quad.
Technically, New Delhi’s stance is accurate – just because there is a remarkable similarity in membership to these forums, they are not the same institutional architecture. And yet, if one is to go beyond such technicalities, it is clear that these groups share a larger view of the Indo-Pacific, that is, addressing the challenge from China, and creating an open and independent Indo-Pacific. – Pacific Desire. Be it AUKUS, which enables Australia to counter Chinese bullying, or provides the United Kingdom – its aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, the head of the UK’s Carrier Strike Group, is in the region – with a more prominent and desirable role in the Indo-Pacific or the annual Malabar exercise, which focuses on the Indo-Pacific or Quad, their common geopolitical theater is the Indo- Pacific. So while they are not technically related to each other, there is a wider reality that unites them all. There is no point in refusing to accept that axiomatic reality.
There is no doubt even today that the Indo-Pacific is of great importance to India for many reasons. For one, given continental challenges, including new developments in Afghanistan, New Delhi would do well to focus some attention on the maritime sector. 2 to be in the center of It should be used for one’s own safety and prosperity. Third, it is also a major way to bring like-minded states together to prevent Chinese hegemony in the region.
In this context, if AUKUS potentially overshadows the excitement surrounding the Quad, it would be detrimental to India’s interests in the Indo-Pacific region. The other Quad counties are either on AUKUS or are coalition partners; India is not either. Eventually, Quad faces the potential challenge of becoming the talking shop without an actionable mandate. Furthermore, without any defense mechanism, the withdrawal of material from the quad over time would also be minimal.
Indo-Pacific Engagement
The situation is made worse by India’s hesitation to join the major regional economic framework. For example, India is neither a member of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership nor can its trade relations with Indo-Pacific countries rival China’s. So, given our weak economic impact and performance in the Indo-Pacific region, what can help the country be part of a security regime that can take care of its regional defence/security concerns. Even before AUKUS, India’s current involvement in the Indo-Pacific was neither able to contribute to its national security nor boost its economic influence in the region. And now, AUKUS has further narrowed down the potential space available for the Quad and India to play a serious role in the security architecture of the region.
Sources of India’s Hesitation
Even though it is not only New Delhi that is hesitant to enter the security/military domain of the Quad, India has been hesitant to go ahead with the non-military issues of the Quad. So, what are the sources of New Delhi’s hesitation regarding a stronger role for the Quad in the security/military sector? Two hypotheses can be put forward in this regard. One, India’s traditional reluctance about military alliances and the desire to maintain strategic autonomy. New Delhi fears that the militarization of the Quad could undo this jealously guarded tradition. However, it is possible to trace military utility to the Quad without forming a formal military alliance. Furthermore, the pursuit of mutually beneficial military and security cooperation within the Quad framework does not need to contradict the principles of strategic autonomy. The active part of ‘strategic autonomy’ is autonomy, not tactical.
The second hypothesis pertains to domestic political considerations: the Narendra Modi government is keen to avoid any military overtones because of possible Chinese reactions to the Quad. Recall how India and Australia had been lenient on stage for many years for fear of provoking China. Australia seems to have overcome its hesitation, but has India done it? For the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government, any heat on the Line of Actual Control with China in the crucial state elections next year and then the parliamentary election in 2024 will be unwanted. Therefore, it seems that it is a matter of domestic political considerations that is superseding the pursuit of strategic needs.
Happyman Jacob teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and is the founder of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research
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