The Hotel Moskva, near Red Square in the Russian capital, was one of the most powerful architectural symbols of the Stalinist era. Designed by the famous Alexey Shchusev and opened in 1935, it had two distinct facades: one wing was straight-laced with small windows and simple detailing, while the other was ornate and decorative with large windows.
The story behind the twin design is that Shchusev submitted two designs on the same sheet of paper. Stalin put his signature in the middle of both the designs and sent it back. Afraid of his boss checking which one he had chosen, Shchusev combined the two designs into one structure, which stood in Moscow as a symbol of power and fear until it was demolished in 2004. Four Seasons Moscow stands in its place today.
This story is often told to show how even the most famous architect of Soviet Russia feared Stalin. Historically, the rulers of Russia followed the principle that it is better to be feared than loved, and commanded absolute loyalty from both their subordinates and the masses. The reign of Russian President Vladimir Putin has not been entirely different, even though Mr. Putin has always emphasized “constitutional order” and legality. He maintained a tight grip on the system he presided over. As American academic Walter Russell Mead recently wrote, the man in the Kremlin can do anything but appear weak.
But this aura of power and invincibility was shattered on June 24, 2023, when an armed squad of Wagner mercenaries began their march toward Moscow after capturing an important regional military headquarters in southern Russia. In a country where public criticism of the war can land a citizen in prison, Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former Putin confidant and head of Wagner, not only launched an open rebellion against the state, but also walks free. Worse, it was a drama that unfolded at a time when Russia was engaged in a “battle for existence” with the “collective West” in Ukraine.
a strategic mistake
Before the Ukraine war begins on February 24, 2022, Mr. Putin has made a series of risky geopolitical moves that have helped him bolster his support at home and expand Russia’s influence abroad. He neutralized Georgia in 2008 through a small but powerful intervention. He annexed Crimea in 2014 without a fight and has supported Russian-speaking Ukrainian rebels in the Donbass. In 2015, he sent troops into Syria, which hosts Russia’s only naval base outside the former Soviet territory, and averted a civil war.
The Syrian intervention also helped Russia neutralize two of America’s allies – Israel and Turkey. At home, there was no challenge to Mr. Putin’s authority; Former President Dmitry Medvedev was discredited and Nikolai Patrushev, arguably Russia’s second most powerful man, remained a loyal ally. Mr Putin rewrote the constitution so he could theoretically stay in power after 2024, when the next presidential election is due. Then came the Ukraine war.
It is now clear that the Russians were not prepared to fight a prolonged war in Ukraine. Like the Russian intervention in Georgia or the annexation of Crimea, Mr. Putin wanted and expected a quick victory in Ukraine. Before the war, he saw Russia emerging stronger and the West weakening, especially after the defeat of the United States and its humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan (Leonid Brezhnev in the mid-1970s after America’s defeat in Vietnam). That’s the assessment I made, and will do) eventually sending troops into Afghanistan in 1979). Had Mr. Putin secured a quick victory in Ukraine, it would have strengthened Russia’s position as a great power in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and strengthened its position domestically, in addition to a strong presence in West Asia .
But when the Russians failed to win a quick victory, it opened up a strategic opportunity for the Biden administration, just as the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan opened up an opportunity for Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. America, which had fled Kiev by closing its embassy during the war, came back with a vengeance. Russia adapted itself to the new reality of the invasion for a long time. As the war progressed, Mr. Putin’s plan was to defeat the West in a pitched battle. But Mr. Prigozhin’s rebellion shows that the strains of an unlimited limited war are beginning to bother Mr. Putin himself.
Putin’s dilemma
Mr. Prigozhin’s rebellion is a microcosm of what went wrong for Mr. Putin after the war began. The mercenary chief is attacking Russia’s wartime defense establishment and the way the war has been waged for months. To any observer of Russian politics, it was clear that something was amiss in Mr. Putin’s inner circle. But still, the Russian leader has failed to contain Mr. Prigozhin, a Frankenstein warlord of his own creation. And even after starting the rebellion, Mr. Prigozhin was allowed to walk free. Why did Mr. Putin, who once famously said he would never forgive betrayal, compromise with the man who challenged his authority?
The answer lies in the complex power structures of Russian politics. The war in Ukraine may not have progressed as planned, but Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has shown it to have happened in the past. It was Mr. Shoigu who conquered Crimea. It was under Mr. Shoigu that Russia made its successful military intervention in Syria. Also in Ukraine, after initial mistakes (which allowed the West to reinforce itself and stand behind Ukraine with money, weapons, training, and other resources), Russian troops were on the front lines, fighting Ukrainian counteroffensives. There is a huge fortification. At this time, weakening the Ministry of Defense could affect the war plans.
On the other hand, Wagner has been an important geopolitical tool for the Kremlin. This has allowed Russia to increase its influence in Africa without actually committing regular Russian troops. Wagner has also been effective on the front lines in Ukraine this year, capturing Solder and Bakhmut in Donetsk, which has made him popular, at least among nationalist sections. So cracking down on Wagner may not only lead to Russian bloodshed, but also public backlash and confusion and operational inertia on the front line. This has put Mr. Putin in a dilemma. He cannot spare the generals; He cannot crush Wagner. So what he has chosen to do is to make peace even at the cost of appearing weak.
main challenge
Historically, bad wars have been bad for Russian leaders. But, Mr Putin is neither Nicholas II nor Mikhail Gorbachev. At least his last 23 years of rule show that Mr. Putin is a survivor. It should be noted that even in a moment of weakness for the regime, no one from the Russian elite came out in support of the rebellion. Most members of Mr. Putin’s Security Council as well as local leaders issued statements in support of “the motherland” and the president. And soon after the rebellion was quelled, Mr. Putin moved to take over Wagner’s global empire. The problem is that the mutiny could have been avoided without bloodshed, but the underlying causes that gave rise to the mutiny – the war itself, infighting between commanders, and the Kremlin’s perceived weakness in controlling the elite – were ignored.
Last year, when Russia suffered military setbacks in Kharkiv, Mr. Putin shrugged off the humiliation and ordered a partial mobilization. But his hands would be further weakened if Russia suffered more defeats on the battlefield, as he himself warned of Russia’s retreat in World War I and the “collapse of the state” thereafter. If anything, Mr. Prigozhin’s debacle has made Mr. Putin’s future deeply tied to the outcome of the Ukraine war. And he is aware of it.
stanly.johny@thehindu.co.in