Return to the Afghan Theater

Among the many messages that New Delhi wanted to send3rd Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan’ On November 10 – a National Security Advisor (NSA)-level meeting – a noteworthy note is that India remains critical of Afghan affairs, despite the current absence of a ground presence in the country. To ensure that the idea was accepted by the Indian political and strategic sections as well as by the region, Indian officials in their background briefing emphasized that India’s invitation to countries with a significant stake in Afghanistan – Russia, Iran and was accepted by all five countries. Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). He rightly dismissed Pakistan’s outright refusal to attend the meeting and China’s lame excuse for its absence. Indeed, given the current state of India-China relations and Pakistan’s obsession with keeping India away from Afghanistan, neither country’s decision was surprising.

similar concern

There is no doubt that this initiative was successful in demonstrating that many regional countries recognize that India has legitimate concerns regarding Afghanistan. The Delhi Declaration that emerged from the deliberations of the National Security Advisors/Secretaries of the National Security Councils of the participating States shows that all these countries share similar concerns which are also widespread in the international community. The Delhi Declaration demanded that the soil of Afghanistan should not be used to spread terrorism or extremist ideologies. It demanded control over the production of Afghan opium. This reflects the widely held view that the Taliban must conform to accepted standards of behavior on gender issues and minority rights. The manifesto also called for the formation of “an open and truly inclusive government” that was “representative of the will of the Afghan people” and the participation of “all sections of society” in its “administrative and political structure”. It’s a laudable objective, but is it realistic? The hard fact is that the Taliban won a military victory and now controls the whole of Afghanistan, unlike in the 1990s. Is any of Afghanistan’s neighbors ready to promote a long-lasting insurgency to effectively pressure the Taliban?

editorial | Undefined Role: On India-Afghanistan Bilateral Relations

Obstacles, an outreach

All participants of the Delhi Dialogue except India have open links with the Taliban, even though some of them consider the Taliban a negative political force. Therefore, it is likely that despite this collective call for an inclusive government, these states will eventually settle individually for a Taliban government that will respond to a certain extent to gender issues and minority rights, including ethnic minorities. More than that they will look at how the Taliban are addressing their personal concerns over the specific terrorist groups that target them. The statement of the Russian press after the Delhi Declaration itself shows that each country will not act on the basis of normal terms in this document but keeping in mind its own interests.

It is here that Indian policy makers are still struggling to accept the consequences and realities of the great transformation that took place in Afghanistan on August 15, when Afghan President Ashraf Ghani fled Kabul and the Taliban entered. This far-reaching development made it very weak. Based on India’s Afghan policy, this required an immediate re-evaluation of the regional situation and swift, swift and comprehensive action taking into account strategic considerations. It required a ruthlessly cold view of ‘all political and strategic classes’ unaffected by political views of any nature. It has not been found even after almost three months. And, the Delhi meeting, while serving a small diplomatic purpose, will not contribute to addressing the vast challenges that India now faces across its western neighbourhood, particularly in Afghanistan.

Pakistan Link

Pakistan has avoided its mistake of giving formal diplomatic recognition to the Taliban in the 1990s. Although it is working in a way with the group’s government, which it helped hold together, as it would have with a ‘recognized’ administration. It is no coincidence that the day the Delhi talks were called, the acting Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Mullah Amir Khan Muttaki, arrived in Islamabad, leading a high-level delegation. Pakistan has a free hand in the absence of India in Kabul. It has a unique and enduring advantage because of its deep and enduring relationship with the Taliban. But does this mean that India completely ignores Afghanistan and confines itself to only covert contacts with the Taliban? There has been no repetition of the Doha-like meeting between the Indian ambassador and senior Taliban officials.

a place for india

India will have to play a multifaceted diplomatic game to protect and promote its interests in Afghanistan and the region. It cannot join the game until it has re-established its presence in Kabul. All the important regional players and Russia have kept their missions open in Kabul. New Delhi should note that the Taliban spokesperson, while focusing on the talks, said that India is an important regional country with which it seeks good diplomatic relations.

India has to proceed cautiously but without any hindrance. This can only happen through an understanding of Afghan traditions and culture that have been in tension but which have not disappeared completely. At no stage in Afghan history has any ruler or group been troubled by foreign dependence, however necessary. He has always looked for alternatives. The indications of Pakistan’s Taliban regarding India should be taken in this context.

Furthermore, the Taliban are not untouched by regional and tribal rifts. This is not to underestimate the difficulties India faces in Afghanistan, but it would be a grave mistake to consider that there is no place for India to work in Afghanistan; Public statements by the Taliban themselves are indicating that it does; Muttaki has publicly stated that Pakistan should allow Indo-Afghan trade through Wagah.

Expressing concern for the “deteriorating socio-economic and humanitarian situation in Afghanistan”, the Delhi Declaration called for “immediate humanitarian assistance” to the Afghan people. It also stressed that humanitarian aid should be provided to Afghanistan “in a free, direct and assured manner”. This is directly relevant to India, which wants to send 50,000 tonnes of wheat to the Afghan people via Pakistan. Obviously, the Taliban have welcomed India’s offer and asked Pakistan to agree. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan told Muttaki that he would “favourably” consider the Taliban’s request. At this stage, India should be courageous and increase its offer to one million metric tonnes of wheat; He made the same pledge at the Tokyo Afghanistan Conference in 2002. If needed, it should also publicly declare that it will hand over the wheat to the World Food Program at the Wagah border. If Pakistan obstructs the additional offer, let it tell the Afghan people about its negativity.

on china

India will have to face not only in Afghanistan but also with China. China has always maintained contact with the Taliban and they have strategic and economic interests and will continue to adopt pragmatic policies. Indian economic interests also demand its presence in Afghanistan. There is no time to lose for this purpose. A heavy and long term price will be paid otherwise. India should in fact remain on the ground throughout this process, but this seems to be absent among some Indian analysts, who believe that it is also a Eurasian power. That should be the aim. But is it so today, when it lacks connectivity to the region and is reluctant to play the Afghan game where it matters – the mountains and valleys of the Hindu Kush?

Vivek Katju is a retired member of the Indian Foreign Service