A US Army soldier during an Indo-US joint exercise or “Yudh Abhyas” in Auli, Uttarakhand, near the disputed border with China | Photo Credit: AP
If major contradictions are to determine strategic priorities, then New Delhi must decide what its major contradiction is. The concept of a key conflict – the one that is the most acute challenge facing an individual/organization, and has the power to shape its future choices and resulting outcomes – is a useful way to optimize and prioritize strategic decision making. Whether Indian policy-makers make it so or not, China is contemporary India’s major strategic contradiction. Every other challenge, be it Pakistan, internal insurgency, and difficulties in relations with its neighbors, fall into the category of secondary contradictions.
If so, then I would argue that key decisions in New Delhi’s strategic decision matrix should pass the China test, which is equivalent to asking and answering a fairly straightforward question: “Whether x or y decisions/ development/relations help to deal with the China challenge, or not?” Decision makers should view the decision/development/relationship in the light of this answer. It is not that secondary contradictions are not important or that they do not add up to the primary contradiction. An efficient ‘China test’ can help prioritize strategic decision-making over the longer term, at least as an analytical tool with potential policy utility.
From a functional point of view, the ‘China test’ consists of three distinct elements. First, an assessment of how a certain Indian decision or a specific regional development coincides with Chinese regional strategy or interests. Second, India’s decision or assessment of a certain regional development would require India to make amendments at the level of secondary contradictions. and third, an assessment of whether this would require any major policy changes internally. Let me highlight the usefulness of the ‘China test’ using a few examples.
India America relations
New Delhi has had a complex relationship with Washington that is increasingly normalized and interest-driven. Despite its withdrawal from the region, Washington is seeking to reengage South Asia (Pakistan, South Asia in general, the Indo-Pacific and perhaps even the Taliban). It appears that the lesson New Delhi learned from the standoff with China at the Line of Actual Control in 2020 was that it was perhaps a result of India’s growing proximity to the US, if so, should New Delhi be Should it downgrade its ties with the US, especially in the Indo-Pacific, in the hope that this will deter Beijing’s aggression? Or, should India continue with a strategic partnership with the US, regardless of what China thinks of it?
What would the ‘China test’ of Indo-US relations suggest? Given that Beijing seeks to dominate the region, it is clearly not in its interest to witness US re-engagement in the region or a growing Indo-US rapprochement. If so, the lack/less warmth of India-US strategic engagement in the region will help Beijing’s long-term objectives. A China test will show that New Delhi should not succumb to the short-term temptation of not being on China’s wrong side considering its long-term implications. While fears of such ties troubling China may not be entirely unwarranted, they certainly play into the Chinese strategy of boxing India in the region.
Does China test require India to cool down its relations with Pakistan? Let us ask ourselves the question: “Does making (relative) peace with Pakistan help India deal better with China?” The answer, in my opinion, is a resounding yes. Imagine this. For China, the best-case scenario is that India is fully engaged with Pakistan, which ensures that India is not focused on the growing threat from China, allowing Beijing to displace the traditional Indian hegemony in South Asia. getting the opportunity. Therefore, for India, a course-correction on Pakistan, even if it is ex-post facto, is strategically sensible.
Let me put this in a slightly different way. India should not actively balance power in South Asia with Pakistan but balance Chinese power in South Asia. Therefore, India’s objective in South Asia should be to defuse conflicts with Pakistan, so that it can focus on China. Similarly, India need not oppose US engagement of Pakistan for the same reason – it helps prevent Pakistan from switching completely to China’s camp. A Pakistan that has relations with the US and the West is better for India than a Pakistan that has been rejected by the US and the West.
Russia Connection
India-Russia relations are among the most contentious bilateral relations in the world today in the wake of the Ukraine war. Apply the China test to examine the logic behind India-Russia relations in the face of Western pressure on India to break away from Moscow. “Will continuing its ties with Moscow help New Delhi better deal with the challenge from China?”
The answer may not be straightforward, but the China test provides an answer. The US and its allies want India to end talks with Moscow and condemn its aggression against Ukraine, which India has so far refused to do. In return, greater accommodation of Indian interests is being offered, perhaps including diplomatic and political support against Chinese aggression. The growing closeness between Moscow and Beijing also undermines the strength of Indo-Russian relations. So, does New Delhi need to continue engaging with Moscow against all these odds to test China? While I am personally convinced that India-Russia relations are deteriorating, there is a strong argument for New Delhi to continue its ties with Moscow – that is China.
Think about it. If indeed New Delhi were to completely disengage from Russia (as India’s US and western partners have told India), what would be the likely consequences of such a decision? Such a decision is likely to go into the hands of China. For one, in the absence of Indo-Russian ties, the extent of Sino-Russian cooperation is likely to strengthen, and India will be cut off from the continental space to its north and west. Second, New Delhi enjoys subsidized energy, cheap defense equipment (even if some of it has to be retrofitted with more sophisticated technology from elsewhere), support in the UN Security Council, and Moscow New Delhi’s ‘political sensitivity’ Has been understanding ‘ than their western partners. Many of these could be in trouble if India decides to break away from Russia, and the natural beneficiary of such a situation would undoubtedly be China. This could push Moscow towards Pakistan with or without Beijing’s side.
It is also important to note that Moscow is not eager to let China dominate the strategic space around it and has been keen to balance China’s growing influence in Central Asia with partners such as New Delhi. The retreat of Moscow to New Delhi will ensure that China gets a free hand in Central Asia as well. In a sense, the China piece best explains the puzzle called India-Russia relations.
For New Delhi, the message of China’s test is simple – deftly balancing China in South Asia and beyond should be a key element of India’s grand strategic planning and decision-making.
Happymon teaches at the Jacob School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and is the founder of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research.