Should the government come out with a white paper on Ladakh?

How do you view the report prepared by a senior police officer in Ladakh, which states that India has lost patrolling access to 26 out of 65 patrolling points since 2020?

Satish Dua: The Superintendent of Police in Leh would have little experience or experience manning border patrols and patrolling points. If the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), which does some patrolling as the army does in those parts, had put out the report, I would have found it more credible.

Manoj Joshi: I see it in the context that the government is not telling us much about the situation on the LAC. If a police officer brings a report to a conference of DGPs sponsored by the Intelligence Bureau, the officer talks to several people, including the ITBP, to write it. The report states a specific number of patrol points, and I don’t see any errors in them. For example, if you look at the Depsang Bulge, the name of every patrolling point there has been mentioned in the report. I would call the report credible. This shows that the situation in Ladakh along the LAC appears to be much more serious than disclosed by the government.

Given everything that has happened since 2020 till now, how do you rate the government’s response to the Chinese action apart from the army’s response on the LAC?

Manoj Joshi: Military sources have actually been more forthcoming than the government. The government has been twisting the issue since the time the Prime Minister said that no one has entered [Indian territory], and no post has been lost. The fact is that the entire Depsang Bulge has been blocked by the Chinese, and is still blocked. And it appears that there are other areas also where Chinese troops have occupied our patrolling points. Of course, some points have been denied to us by mutual agreement, as we have agreed to create these buffer zones along some parts of the LAC. And I think all this should be accepted.

Satish Dua: A distinction must be made between the government’s response and the army’s response. The government could have done better in terms of information provided by official sources. We value the confidentiality of operational matters, and obviously those details cannot be shared. But some more information could have been provided about patrolling points and buffer zones created. The buffer zones have been created with mutual consent. And the purpose of these zones is to avoid any kind of confrontation and escalation.

I would also like to add that apart from the Galwan and Kailash range incidents we have not seen any action between the two armies for more than half a century. This means that our responses, military-level talks and WMCC (Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs) talks have helped ensure that whenever patrols come face-to-face does not progress further. This is saying a lot, considering that both India and China are nuclear states.

So, do you think the government should review its communication strategy? For example, should it consider publishing a white paper on China’s actions at the LAC and India’s response so far?

Satish Dua: In today’s era of information warfare, if there is a lack of information, someone or the other will fill that space. either that space will be filled from the other side [China] Or by those fomenting turmoil in India – armchair strategists with little knowledge of the ground situation. I think we should have given a little more information from official sources without disclosing any details of an operational nature.

Look, in our country we do not have a National Security Strategy or a National Defense Strategy Guidance Document. Compared to the Line of Control (LoC), the LAC has multiple agencies and forces operating without unity of command. ITBP is responsible for border security, which is under the Ministry of Home Affairs. In recent years, the military also patrols; It is under the Ministry of Defence. Special Frontier Force units are deployed along the LAC, which are under the Cabinet Secretariat. WMCC is operated by the Ministry of External Affairs. There is also a high level military dialogue. And there’s a China Study Group that makes some strategic level decisions like patrolling points.

Compare this with the LoC, where we have a Border Security Force deployed, but under the operational control of the Army. That system has been working fine for decades. So, whether you call it a policy directive or a white paper, we need better clarity on the operational and administrative aspects of the LAC.

Manoj Joshi: More than a white paper, the government needs to redraw its border policy. After the Galwan incident, the government has authorized troops, at least those operating in Ladakh, to use guns for self-defense. But we do not know what are the instructions in the East (Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim), because in the Yangtse incident on December 9, 2022, the Chinese tried to capture our posts by physical force, not by gun. So, I think we need to re-strategise on how to handle the LAC. Perhaps we need to create a buffer zone of 5 km on both sides of the LAC so that Indian and Chinese soldiers never physically meet. In a white paper, the government has to reveal many things it does not want to reveal. And I think when it comes to national security, sometimes the government has to make some leeway in making policy in secret.

Should the government consider publishing a paper on the ground situation or a map outlining India’s claims, even if China refuses?

Manoj Joshi: The Chinese had agreed to clarify points of difference on the LAC in 1993, but later stalled. They use the exact LAC to keep us off balance. The root of the problem is China’s intention regarding LAC. In 2014 and 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi attempted to openly call for clarification of the LAC. So, I agree that we should just go ahead and publish a map detailing our perception of the LAC and tell the Chinese, this is it.

Satish Dua: Yes, we should have accurate LAC. The Chinese had agreed in some earlier meetings that we would exchange maps on the 22 identified flashpoints between us and them on the LAC, but they are reluctant to actually exchange maps – although they did once Some maps were given in the central area. For this, it is a good idea for us to present our version publicly in the form of a map. But we should continue this process of dialogue, because only then we can solve technical problems at the grassroots level. In fact, if anything, we should raise the level of dialogue, including at the summit level. We should always keep looking for those opportunities instead of thinking about confrontation.

Manoj Joshi: what we lost in 2020 was trust [in China], We built that trust from 1993 to 2020. There were even two summits in Wuhan and Mamallapuram. Everything was going well. The point is, figuratively speaking, how can you apply toothpaste [trust] back in tube [relationship], You know, despite all the events of 2020, Indian and Chinese officials communicated with military officials over 1,500 times through various hotlines and meetings. So, there’s a process. War between two nuclear-armed powers would be a catastrophe. I think we need to have some frank talks with China. And yes, PM Modi can tell President Xi [Jinping] That trust has been broken after 2020, and China has to restore it. And let us now together try to work on some new processes and procedures to maintain peace and tranquility.

Do past standoffs like the Sumdorong Chu standoff of 1986 or the Depsang standoff of 2013 hold lessons for the government on how to manage public communication?

Manoj Joshi: If the government had disclosed more, then the revelations in the police report would not have caused so much shock. Most Indians do not know that we are being denied access to a vast area of ​​about 900 sq km in the Depsang Bulge. Government should always err on the side of more information than less. Nonetheless, since 2020 several foreign agencies and trackers have put out satellite information of what happened. Satellite imagery has given us more information about the Yangtse. Therefore, I do not understand why the government should hide information that is already widely available.

Satish Dua: Sumdorong Chu taught us that patience is the name of the game, because it took seven-eight years to solve it. But times have changed since then. This is not the case in the mid-1980s. In this age of information, there is a need for more information. We have to leave aside the question of how much share we have to give to the government and the army. But yes, if the government puts forward the information from its perspective, then speculation stops.