A handout picture from Syria where Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is meeting Russia’s special envoy for Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev, and his accompanying delegation, in the capital Damascus in January 2023. photo credit: AFP
As Syria enters the 13th year of its deadly civil conflict, a bombing in Istanbul on November 13 that killed six people has set in motion a diplomatic process that could bring peace to that tormented land. Turkish authorities immediately blamed Kurdish militants in Syria, represented by the People’s Protection Units (YPG, in its Kurdish abbreviation), for the bombing, and even arrested a Syrian woman who Acknowledged his affiliation with Kurdish organizations in Turkey and Syria.
From 20 November, Turkey began “Operation Claw-Sword” with a series of bombings on Kurdish targets in both Syria and Iraq. Turkish attacks are directed at the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) which includes the YPG and controls large parts of northeastern Syria under US protection. It has close ties to its domestic Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Turkey views as a terrorist organization.
Turkey has been threatening military strikes on Kurdish positions in Syria since May last year. It has been postponed at Russian insistence, giving Turkey an opportunity to consider diplomatic options to serve its security interests.
Russia-Turkey-Syria engagement
In late November, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan proposed a re-engagement with Syria, following earlier talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, beginning with meetings of the defense and foreign ministers, and the three leaders’ summit. The conference ended with ,
Domestic considerations are also in play as Mr Erdogan faces elections in June. A hard anti-Kurdish stance appeals to Turkish nationalists, while improved relations with Damascus would facilitate the return of 3.7 million Syrian refugees, whose presence has caused considerable unhappiness among the general Turkish population.
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Defense ministers met in Moscow on 28 December – the first ministerial-level meeting between Syria and Turkey since 2011. However, the complex issues dividing Syria and Turkey quickly became apparent. Syrian media reported that Turkey had agreed to withdraw its forces from areas it held in northern Syria and be replaced by Syrian government forces. But Turkey has been quick to clarify that while it has no plans on Syrian territory, its troops will only withdraw if there is no terrorist threat – an apparent reference to the SDF.
regional diplomatic influence
In the midst of the Ukraine war, Turkey continues its balancing act between the United States and Russia: it has supplied drones to Ukraine; But it has also facilitated agreements related to the supply of grain through the Bosphorus and refused to engage in Western sanctions on Russia.
Turkey and Russia continue to work together in Syria, although differences remain. On the question of the Kurds, the Russian and Syrian priority is to separate the Kurds from the US, curb their separatist aspirations, and ensure the integrity of Syria. They expect Turkey’s demand for a 30-kilometer “security zone” on the Syrian-Turkish border to replace Kurdish militias with Syrian government troops. However, Turkey has so far not distanced itself from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) extremists, which control the northern Idlib province, a key Russian and Syrian demand.
Some progress is evident on the Kurdish issue: In the face of Turkish threats to invade Syria in November, the US quickly withdrew its diplomatic personnel from the region, seen as a sign of less interest in protecting the Kurds. It is in this background that SDF leader Mazloum Abdi has spoken publicly about the importance of Syrian unity and the need to “coordinate with the Syrian military to prevent Turkey’s occupation of Syria”.
Outlook for Syria
Syria believes its hand is stronger than ever. Syria is increasingly being incorporated into the Arab world: in addition to the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain opening embassies in Damascus, in early December, a Syrian-Saudi dialogue on countering the insurgency took place in Riyadh over four days. Symbolically, the Syrian flag was raised on the streets of Riyadh during the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping (December 7–9). The kingdom has encouraged this rapprochement with Syria to ensure that Arab interests are not undermined under Turkish and Iranian influence.
The United States strongly opposes the Russia-sponsored trilateral talks and the improvement of regional states’ relations with Syria. But it has little capacity to counter Turkish initiatives in Syria or provide effective support to the beleaguered Kurds. It maintains 900 soldiers in northeast Syria, but they have no idea what purpose they are serving.
Again, Russia and Iran remain strong supporters of vital Syrian interests – the elimination of HTS extremists in Idlib, the dilution of Kurdish aspirations for autonomy and the incorporation of Kurds within the Syrian state, and the exit of the US military presence in Syria . North east. Therefore, Syria has so far shown no enthusiasm for high-level engagements with Turkey, hoping to obtain more firm Turkish guarantees related to its interests. This is probably being facilitated by Iran: Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdullahian met Mr Erdoğan and his Turkish counterpart during his visit to Ankara on 17 January, while the latter has said he would like to visit Syria in early February. Can meet the Foreign Minister.
These trends suggest that the coming years may see a slow return to peace in Syria, after more than a decade.
Talmeez Ahmed is a former diplomat