Last November, as war raged in Ukraine, there were fears that the G20 summit in Bali would be marred by no-shows and walkouts. But the talkfest was moderately successful. Chinese leader Xi Jinping met Joe Biden in person for the first time since becoming the US President. The 20-member club issued a joint statement (the most controversial paragraph about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, declared that the majority of members condemned the war). Can Indonesia create similar magic as the new chair of the ten-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)?
The field could use some leadership. Myanmar’s civil war is estimated to have killed 30,000 people and displaced two million people over the past two years. China continues to threaten its Southeast Asian neighbors in the South China Sea. And ASEAN has struggled to eke out a sense of purpose for the Pacific’s new groupings, including the Quad, an initiative of the US, Australia, India and Japan, and AUKUS, which includes the US, Australia and Britain.
Indonesia’s year-long diversion should at least give more prominence to ASEAN. The country is the largest economy in the region and ASEAN’s so-called “first among equals”. Under President Joko Widodo, Indonesia, which has long been a bystander in world affairs, has also exerted itself a bit more abroad. Jokowi, as the president is known, is a fan of “down to earth” diplomacy, which mainly translates as prioritizing Indonesia’s economic gains.
According to Rizal Sukma, Indonesia’s former ambassador to the UK, the country’s diplomats are given three mandates: to promote exports, foreign investment and tourism. The slogan of Indonesia’s ASEAN leadership is “the center of development”.
Yet that approach does not promise much action against China’s territorial aggression. Jokowi’s signature economic policy is to extract more value from Indonesia’s rich mineral deposits. And no country is contributing more to that effort than China, which has invested billions of dollars to help Indonesia process the world’s largest nickel reserves. This has sometimes caused friction within Indonesia. There have been scuffles between Chinese and Indonesian workers at some Chinese projects. The China-backed high-speed rail project is running over deadline and budget. Still, Chinese investment of more than $8 billion in Indonesia in 2022 is a powerful reason for Jokowi not to push China back, as some ASEAN members and the US (which invested $3 billion) want.
The President is primarily concerned with protecting Indonesian waters from Chinese maritime aggression. With this in mind, Indonesia recently signed an agreement with Vietnam to demarcate their exclusive economic zones, which the two countries had previously opposed. Jokowi is also keen to defend Indonesia’s sovereignty against China around Natunas, east of Singapore. Although China does not directly claim the Indonesian islands, the “nine-dash-line” it has drawn around almost the entire South China Sea divides their waters.
Yet although this is an issue that affects most ASEAN members, Jokowi is unlikely to rally them on it. In fact, he has no particular ambition for Indonesia’s ASEAN leadership other than attracting more investment and business.
His attitude towards Myanmar’s ruling junta will be a test of this. Last year ASEAN banned generals from attending its meetings, pending progress on a hypothetical peace plan that would include an end to violence and the appointment of a regional envoy to the war-torn country. Myanmar has not implemented the plan. And ASEAN remains divided on how to respond.
Thailand tried to negotiate with the junta in December through an informal dialogue that was boycotted by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. Some ASEAN countries may argue that the election to be held in August should lead to broader regional reunification. Jokowi has given conflicting signals. He says that ASEAN will not be “held hostage” by the junta, also that Indonesia will send a general to Myanmar to hold talks. It does not indicate a serious attempt to end the country’s plight.
Meanwhile, Indonesia is preparing for the presidential election to be held in February 2024. After two terms in office, Jokowi is not running for re-election. But the domestic issues that dominated the campaign may still figure into his foreign policy in some form. The latest conflict between Chinese and Indonesian workers may put pressure on the president to toughen up the Chinese offensive. Or, perhaps more likely, it could persuade him to make his thorny regional leadership role even less of a priority than he otherwise would be.
© 2023, The Economist Newspaper Limited. All rights reserved. From The Economist, published under license. Original content can be found at www.economist.com
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