Stopping the US-China N-Arms Race

During the summer, satellite images showed that China was in the process of building more than 300 new missile silos in its northern desert. Some of these silos are likely to be used only as empty decoctions. But if even half of them become sites for nuclear-armed missiles, it would represent nearly three times that of China’s nuclear arsenal.

Following these revelations, the US State Department warned in October that, “The rapid build-up of the PRC’s nuclear arsenal is a threat to international security and stability. … We call Beijing an arms race and conflict.” We encourage you to join us on practical measures to reduce the risk of destabilization.” But China’s ambassador for disarmament Li Song fired back the same day, describing the US’s new agreement with Australia and the United States. Kingdom (AUKUS) as a “textbook case” of nuclear proliferation fueling a regional arms race to help Australia acquire nuclear submarines.

To date, China has refused to engage in talks with the US on strategic arms control (whether bilaterally or trilaterally with Russia) unless the US substantially cuts its arsenal of about 4,000 active weapons. does. Yet, by pursuing rapid expansion of its own, China has begun to undermine this argument, making the need for talks increasingly urgent.

In September 2021, former Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs Sha Zhukang became the latest prominent voice in Beijing to argue that China’s first-strike nuclear policy is “no longer appropriate”. “Strategic pressure on China is intensifying”, Sha said, “as [the US] It has formed new military alliances and as it increases its military presence in our neighbourhood. The policy should no longer apply, he said, “until China and the US negotiate a mutual understanding on the first use of nuclear weapons, or until the US ceases. Undermining the effectiveness of China’s strategic forces.” to take any negative measures”.

Shah’s intervention is serious. Chinese officials do not randomly engage in Chinese public debate. They are authorized to do so, especially in relation to an existential issue such as nuclear security.

China’s new nuclear currency would represent a destabilizing change. But Sha’s remarks also serve to expose the crux of the current impasse. The US needs to clearly understand the deeply worrying view of the Chinese government regarding its own nuclear and wider geo-strategic vulnerability. Chinese President Xi Jinping has repeatedly described the situation as a decades-long “struggle” against a power that is determined to by any means prevent China’s rise.

But this same insight also provides the key to breaking the current impasse. China’s strategic culture is deeply realistic. US negotiators will get nowhere with a moral appeal to China to do the right thing; But one can make cold, practical arguments.

The deep US-China rivalry could create an incentive for Beijing itself to come to the table, provided the US can convince the Chinese that they would be less vulnerable with no arms-control agreement.

How can this be done? China may not be ready to engage in large-scale talks yet, but it is clearly concerned about US capabilities, and may therefore be willing to start with smaller-scale bilateral talks on strategic transparency and crisis management. Is. A series of “Track-1.5” dialogues focused on such issues—informal talks between government officials—was suspended in 2019. Resuming this or a similar process, possibly after the Biden administration completes its ongoing nuclear currency review in early 2022, would be one. Good first step.

Next can come modest confidence-building measures designed to increase anticipation, reciprocity, and trust. These could also include a notification system for ballistic-missile tests, joint technical assessments of missile-defense capabilities and eventually Chinese participation in the monitoring regime of the new START treaty.

To make real progress, the developments that have troubled China the most – including US missile defense, the development of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, hypersonic conventional precision-strike systems and ambiguity about America’s nuclear posture – but also have to discuss. And the same goes for US concerns over China’s rapid modernization of its nuclear arsenal and its ambiguity about the less restrictive “launch on alert” doctrine.

While starting with bilateral efforts would be valuable in itself, the ultimate objective should be to advance a multilateral arms control agreement that at least includes Russia.

The ultimate goal then would be for each country to agree on the limits of force at the lowest possible level, thereby preventing the progress of the Indo-Pacific nuclear arms race.

Even in the depths of the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union managed to establish de facto safeguards and limits on nuclear weapons. They had good reasons to cooperate. Both had experienced the tumultuous weeks of the Cuban Missile Crisis, as the world drew near to disaster. Today, the US and China—and the world—can’t wait for another crisis like this before taking equal precautions. ©2021/Project Syndicate ( www.project-syndicate.org)

Kevin Rudd is the former Prime Minister of Australia and President of the Asia Society