New Delhi has taken a pro-Moscow stand on the question of Russian attacks against Ukraine
New Delhi has taken a pro-Moscow stand on the question of Russian attacks against Ukraine
New Delhi’s response to the Russian offensive against Ukraine appears to have been shaped by harsh geopolitical conditions, that it is in the middle of its normative beliefs or priorities. Late last week, India avoided a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution that called for condemnation of Russian military action against Ukraine, but it did note its unease of Russian action in writing. did (for the first time).
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who spoke to Russian President Vladimir Putin when the war broke out, called for an “immediate cessation of violence” and has so far refused to heed the sentimental appeal of Ukrainian Ambassador to India Igor Polikha, in which Shri Modi has been requested to mediate. With Mr. Putin to halt Russian military progress. With the UNSC deadlock, a friend of both the United States/West and Russia, and enthusiastically urged by Ukraine, New Delhi is uniquely positioned to conduct some much-needed mediation between rival parties. But it has chosen to remain marginalized and do nothing more than the inevitable minimum. New Delhi just wants this to end.
Read also | India engaged with all stakeholders on Ukraine: Foreign Secretary
Let us call it what it really is: New Delhi has taken a pro-Moscow stand on the question of Russian attacks against Ukraine. This pro-Russian leaning is not just the Indian government’s position, but somewhat surprisingly shared by the Indian strategic community as well. More specifically, the subtle, though indirect, justification of Russian military actions is increasingly being heard from people in the Indian strategic community. Russia’s tilt to India should be seen not only as a product of its time-tested friendship with Moscow, but also as a geopolitical necessity.
Russia’s inclination
India can choose from four possible options: condemn Russian aggression, support Russian aggression, keep silent on Russian aggression, or express displeasure (lack of condemnation) and call for diplomacy. The first option will pit India against Russia, the second will pit it against the US and its allies, the third option will be read as pro-Russian, and the fourth option – which it has taken – is the least harmful. And yet, a position that does not condone Russian aggression and which refrains from voting on a UNSC resolution calling for “condemning Russian aggression and the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine” is in fact a pro-Russian position.
There are understandable reasons for India’s (subtle) pro-Russian position. Let me put it this way: An aggressive Russia is a problem for America and the West, not India. The expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is Russia’s problem, not India’s. India’s problem is China, and it needs both the US/West and Russia to deal with the “China problem”. I will look at India’s response to the crisis in Ukraine in the light of this relatively simple argument.
Read also | India faces tough choice over Ukraine at UNSC, UNGA
Let’s look at the big picture first. Today in New Delhi there is a grim recognition of the weakening of the US-led global order and the rise of China as a counter-pole, which is geographically located right next to India. America’s withdrawal from the region and its decline as a major systems shaper has complicated India’s place in regional geopolitics. Challenging the US-led global order with China as an emerging superpower and Russia as its strategic ally, at a time when China has repeatedly acted on its aggressive intentions with India, and when India Closer to America than ever before. Presents a unique and unprecedented challenge to India, earlier in its history. Therefore, having Russia by its side is more important than ever for India. Moscow may or may not be able to soften Chinese opposition to New Delhi, but the India-Russia strategic partnership may be able to ease New Delhi’s growing isolation in a friendless zone.
Second, there is an emerging dualism in the contemporary Indian strategic Weltonschung: the plight of a continental space grappling with extreme pressure from China, Pakistan and Taliban-led Afghanistan, adding to its strategic claustrophobia; And, the emergence of a maritime zone that presents an opportunity to exit from the same.
Here lies the dilemma for India. New Delhi needs Moscow’s help to manage its continental difficulties, be it through defense supplies, helping it ‘return’ to Central Asia, working together in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Or to explore opportunities for cooperation in Afghanistan. In other words, Russia is probably India’s only participant in the outcome in the entire Asian continental region.
Read also | ‘Disturbed’ India refrains from voting against Russia at UNSC
On the other hand, in the Indo-Pacific region, Russia has no major consequences for India when it comes to the vast maritime domain. That’s where its American and Western partners come in handy. India is not in a position to address China’s challenge in the maritime domain without the active support of the US and Western navies and of course the Quad. This inevitable dualism in the contemporary Indian strategic landscape makes it necessary that India balances both sides, but this may not be possible at the moment without a subtle Russia leaning.
That said, the war on Ukraine could have major implications for India’s strategic reckoning. For one, Russia’s actions in Ukraine, allaying the concerns of the rest of the international community, including the US, will undoubtedly bolster China and its regional ambitions. Second, the new sanctions regime could have implications for India’s defense cooperation with Moscow. Third, the longer the standoff lasts, the closer China and Russia can be, which certainly doesn’t help India. Finally, the more serious the US-Russia rivalry, the less focus will be on the Indo-Pacific and China, where India’s interests lie.
impact on foreign policy
India’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine underscores the fact that India is operating from a position of geopolitical vulnerability. While the Indian stand speaks of genuine politics, it calls for more strategic weakness. Here’s a country set in a hostile neighborhood trying to make the best use of a terrible situation in itself. This means that, going forward, India has the potential to become a “swing state”, a “major power” or a “leading power”. “Stands low. We should therefore expect a middle-of-the-road behavior from New Delhi, rather than a firm position on global strategic development.
Read also | Dissatisfied with India’s response: Ukraine envoy
India’s position also reflects the unmistakable indication that when it comes to geopolitics, New Delhi will choose interests over principles. This is nothing new: New Delhi has chosen interests over principles in the past – for example, India has violated the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of neighbors. This time the difference may be that India is choosing interests over principles, even if the issue is not directly related to India. And yet, a careful reading of India’s statements and positions over the past few days also shows that there is a certain amount of discomfort in choosing interests over principles. There is perhaps a realization in New Delhi that the dog-eat-dog world, where rules and good behavior don’t matter, doesn’t help India in the long run either.
Going forward, if tensions between Russia and the West persist, balancing extremes will be a key feature of Indian diplomacy. India is probably already mastering the art. Consider India’s “interpretation of the vote” during a recent vote on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine: even though New Delhi refrained from voting on it (thus with Moscow), it did so in a written note about Russian action. I explained my displeasure.
Worldview with Suhasini Haider | Ukraine crisis: Can India maintain balance?
on strategic autonomy
Finally, what does this mean for India’s ‘strategic autonomy’? Certainly India’s strategic autonomy has been under a lot of pressure for some time now. However, New Delhi’s response to the recent crisis, in particular its “interpretation of the vote” at the UNSC, indicates a careful recourse to the principle of strategic autonomy: India will make cautionary statements and not be pressured by any party Will go In this sense, India’s indirect support for Russia’s position is not the product of Russian pressure, but the result of a desire to defend its interests. Therefore, while we may see a continued erosion of India’s strategic autonomy in the long term – primarily in the form of a need to balance against China – we will continue to see examples where Indian diplomacy will resort to the principle of strategic autonomy.
Happyman teaches India’s foreign policy at the Jacob School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
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