The Old But Relevant Script of the Cuban Missile Crisis

“Tell me how it ends,” is the common saying of generals and leaders in the midst of war. Ukraine war There is no exception. Neither President Volodymyr Zelensky or his Western allies, nor his Russian adversary, President Vladimir Putin, can predict how the war will end.

The earlier assumptions are upheld – Russia’s short ‘special military operation’ to ‘Nazi and de-militarize’ Ukraine is already a nine-month war, and is likely to be extended in 2023; The unity of the Trans-Atlantic North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has not collapsed despite visible internal differences within the US leadership; Mr. Zelensky’s emergence as a wartime leader is surprising; And, poor Russian military planning and performance, a blow. For the present, Russia is too strong to lose and Ukraine, despite NATO’s support, is too weak to win; Therefore, the war proceeds without any ceasefire.

Nevertheless, there is one consequence that must be prevented – the breakdown of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945 and the global conscience has upheld nuclear prohibition for more than 75 years. None of the three headmasters in Ukraine would like the taboo to be violated. However, growth creates its own dynamic.

lessons from Cuba

It’s time to revisit the serious lessons of Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962) That put the world on the edge of nuclear Armageddon, as the US and USSR engaged in an eyeball confrontation. On October 16, 1962, US President John F. Kennedy was informed that the USSR was preparing to deploy medium- and medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. After discussions with his core group of advisers, he rejected the idea of ​​an invasion or nuclear threat against Moscow and announced a Cuban naval ‘quarantine’ on 22 October. Simultaneously, he authorized his brother Robert Kennedy to open a back-channel with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.

The crisis averted on 28 October; Based on back-channel assurances, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced that Soviet nuclear missiles and aircraft would be withdrawn in view of US assurances of respecting Cuba’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. What the two leaders kept a secret was that the US also agreed to withdraw the Jupiter nuclear missiles from Turkey.

Still, a lot of unexpected events happened. On 27 October, a US surveillance flight strayed into Cuban airspace and was targeted by Soviet Air Defense Forces. Major Rudolf Andersen was shot, the only casualty. This happened despite Kennedy’s advice to abstain from provocative surveillance and not to authorize Khrushchev’s engagement. Both sides kept the news a secret until the crisis was averted when Major Anderson’s sacrifice was recognized and honored.

A day earlier, the Soviet nuclear-armed submarine B-59 found itself implicated in US depth charges off Cuban waters. The US was unaware that the submarine was equipped with nuclear weapons and Captain Valentin Savitsky did not know that a quarantine was in operation. He decided to enter the fight but his decision to launch an atomic bomb was vetoed by Captain Vasily Arkhipov. The Soviets followed the two-person-authority rule and a possible Armageddon, unknown to Kennedy and Khrushchev, was averted.

The most shocking revelation came decades later when the US learned that unknown to them, more than 150 warheads for the FKR-1 Meteor missile, short-range FROG missile and gravity bombs were already in Cuba. These were intended for defense if the US failed the 1961 iteration. Bay of Pigs Invasion, Despite opposition from Cuban leader Fidel Castro, Premier Khrushchev insisted on withdrawing these as well, knowing they could provide the spark for future growth.

The main lesson learned was that the two nuclear superpowers should abstain from any direct confrontation, even if their rivalry played out in other areas, keeping it below the nuclear threshold. Resistance theorists have called this the ‘stability-instability-paradox’. With their sure-second-strike-ability guaranteed mutually-assured-destruction, both the US and the USSR were bound to limit instability to proxy wars. For decades nuclear war games were unable to overcome the challenge of confining a nuclear war when a nuclear weapon was introduced into the war.

Russia’s nuclear signal

Ukraine is testing the old lesson of war nuclear deterrence. Russia sees itself at war, not with non-nuclear Ukraine, but with nuclear-armed NATO. That’s why Mr Putin has engaged in repeated nuclear signals – from personally attending large-scale exercises involving ‘strategic forces’ in mid-February, to putting nuclear forces on ‘special war alert’ on 27 February. For.

He raised the stakes again on 21 September when he ordered ‘partial mobilization’, announced referendums in the four regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhya, accused the West of engaging in nuclear blackmail and warned that Russia have ‘more modern weapons’. and will ‘certainly use all available weapon systems; It’s not a hoax’. He cited the US bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 as an example.

However, Russian nuclear use makes little operational sense. In 1945, Japan was on the verge of surrender and only the US had nuclear weapons. The use of strategic nuclear weapons would only strengthen the Ukrainian national resolve; The NATO reaction is unlikely to be nuclear, but will be rapid. The international political response will be critical and Mr Putin could find himself increasingly isolated. Many countries in East and Central Asia may reconsider nuclear weapons as a security requirement.

Role for Global Diplomacy

During the next few weeks, fighting in Ukraine will intensify before winter begins and the weather will halt military operations until spring. This increases the risk of escalation and miscalculation. Right now, the goal of a ceasefire seems far-fetched, though highly desirable. The United Nations appears to be paralyzed in view of the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council. It is, therefore, up to other global leaders who have reach and influence, to convince Mr. Putin that a nuclear escalation would be a disastrous move.

Indonesia is G-20 President and President Joko Widodo will host the summit next month. India is the coming chair; Prime Minister Narendra Modi will attend the summit. Both Indonesia and India have refrained from condemning Russia by keeping communication channels open. In a bilateral meeting with Mr Putin in Samarkand last month, Mr Modi emphasized that “now is not the era of war”. For the G-20 summit, Mr Widodo and Mr Modi are well prepared to take a diplomatic initiative to persuade Mr Putin to move away from nuclear rhetoric. This means emphasizing and not expanding the deterrent role of nuclear weapons; To reiterate Russia’s official declaratory position that prohibits nuclear use for an “existential threat”.

Such a statement would help reduce growing fear and could also provide a channel for communication and open the door for a dialogue that could lead to a ceasefire. Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis are still valid 60 years later.

Rakesh Sood is a former diplomat and currently Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation