Thoughts on ‘quasi-federal’ democracy

Events coinciding with the jubilee of India’s independence draw attention to the federal structure of the Constitution of India, a democratic imperative of multi-cultural India, where the constituent units of the sovereign state focus on language against competing identities such as caste, tribe. are based. or religion. This inherent structural capacity for conflict within and between units and between them and the sovereign state, requires imaginative federal craftsmanship and sensitive political management. The ability of the Indian Constitution to maintain its wide diversity within a sovereign state, along with a formal democratic framework, is remarkable. Arguably, with universal adult suffrage and free institutions of justice and governance, it is nearly impossible to polarize its wide diversity within any one divisive identity, even Hindutva; So that, despite its operational flaws, the democratic structure and national integrity are dialectically intertwined. But its operational fault lines are increasingly denting liberal institutions, undermining the federal democratic structure as recent events have underlined.

some fault lines

First, the stormy Parliament session, where the Rajya Sabha chairman broke down (in August 2021), unable to act despite the use of marshals; Nevertheless, the House passed a record number of bills amid a record number of adjournments. Second, cross-border police firing by one constituent state against another, fatally, resulted in retaliatory action in the form of restrictions on goods trade and travel relations with its land-locked neighbour.

Such unfamiliar incidents of federal democracy happen again and again in India, except in their present intensity. The legislative disruption was described as a ‘legitimate democratic right, and duty’ by a Union Law Minister (while in opposition). In the 1960s, the troika around Lohia asserted its right to enter parliament on the shoulders of the public to take out on marshals; Posters labeled ‘CIA Agent’ were displayed during the debate; The ‘suitcases’ were publicly transferred to protect the government; Occasionally, “Honorable Members” emerged from the debate with injuries. This time, in the “federal chamber”, the “honorable member” and the marshals are in physical contact – both claiming ‘casualties’ – official papers are torn down and the presidents immobilized. Inter-state conflict has also assumed a new dimension.

major changes

Such empirical realities have led scholars to conceptualize India’s “post-colonial democracy” and federalism, as distinct from their liberal role-models. Rajni Kothari’s “Congress system” model of “one party dominance” has now been replaced by the Bharatiya Janata Party; Myrdall’s “Soft State” is reborn in the Pegasus era with fake videos and new tools of mass distraction and coercion. Galbraith’s “working anarchy”, is now more and more criminalized in India’s democracy, involving more than 30% of legislators with criminal records, and courtrooms turning into gang war zones; It’s more chaotic now, but still functioning, bypassing any “dangerous decade” or “1984”.

Federal theorist Casey Where analyzes India’s “centralized state with some federal characteristics” as “quasi-federal”. He highlights the structural flaws of Indian federalism not only in terms of operations. Therefore, while many democratic distortions are amenable to mitigation by institutional professionalism, Indian federalism, to be democratically federal, despite having an “infrastructure”, requires institutional modification. Where’s argument is worth considering.

many shortcomings

Democratic federalism regards institutions as ensuring equality between units and the center so that they can coordinate with each other, and are subject to a sovereign constitution – their disputes are decided with impeccable professional and moral credibility by an independent judiciary. Huh. But India’s federal structure is constitutionally plagued by deficiencies in all these respects, and is operationally affected by institutional breaches in the overall democratic process. Like popular voting behavior, institutional preferences are based either on ethnic or kinship networks, or on individual role-models, like anti-incumbency, as perceived lesser evil: TN Seshan for the Election Commission of India, of the police JF Ribeiro for Justice or Chandrachud or Nariman for Justice Judiciary.

India’s federal structure based on the colonial ‘1935 Act’, which introduced ‘provincial autonomy’, attempted to democratize it: renaming “provinces” to autonomous “states”; Transfer of all “reserve powers” to popular rule; Constitutionally dividing the powers between the two levels; Inclusion of federalism in the Preamble, and Parts 3 and 4 including the “Fundamental Rights” of citizens and the “Directive Principles”; But nothing about the rights of the states, not even their territorial boundaries. This has enabled the Center to unilaterally change the state boundaries and create new states. The Indian Constitution has been amended 105 times in 70 years as compared to 27 times in over 250 years in the United States.

The constitutional division of power and resources remains heavily skewed in favor of the Centre, with ‘nation-building’ as a priority; With “residual”, “concurrent” and “implicit” powers, it compromises the primary federal principle of equality between them, which is actively reinforced by extra-constitutional accretion. While the judiciary has the power to decide on their conflicts, with higher judicial appointments (an estimated 41% lying vacant), promotions and transfers becoming a central prerogative, their operations are becoming increasingly controversial.

structural conflict

The story is no different for the “All India Services”, including the state cadre. From the operational point of view, the role of governors is the most distorted: Appointed by the Centre, it is the political patronage that turns this constitutional right of a federal “link” into a central “agent” in the states. Thus, important instruments of national governance are either delegated or appropriated by the Centre, leaving with politically contentious subjects such as law and order and land reforms to the states. Thus, much of India’s federal conflicts are structural, reinforced by operational abuses.

Nevertheless, there is no federal chamber to resolve conflicts politically. The Rajya Sabha indirectly represents the states whose legislators elect it, but continues after the electors are out or dismissed; Without residential qualifications, the House is a major source of political and financial protection for all political parties, at the expense of the people of the state they “represent”.

Presumably, this explains its continuity. Constituting about half the Lok Sabha, proportionately, this reinforces the representative deficit of Parliament, which, through the Westminster system of ‘winner-take-all’, continues to elect the majority parties and governments with a minority of the electoral votes. Is. The second house does not have the authority to neutralize the demographic burden of the states with a large representation in the popular house; It cannot veto its legislation, unlike the US Senate. It can only delay, which explains the interrupts. Joint sessions to resolve their differences are predictable and comical in the form of “voice votes” in the Houses. India’s bicameral legislature, without ensuring a federal house, persists on the general criticism: “when the second house already agrees, it is unnecessary, when it disagrees, it is harmful”.

Historically, party compositions decide when they agree or disagree. Whenever a party with an overwhelming majority in a state finds itself marginalized in the central legislature, it disrupts proceedings such that popular issues not visible in legislative proceedings provoke undemocratic expression and mutual repression. Such examples still exist in India’s “quasi-federal” democracy.

lessons to be learned

Empirical and scholarly evidence suggests that Where’s preoccupation with federalism arguably applies to other constitutional goals (largely operational), while federal flaws are structural, fueling conflicts and violence, endemic in the distorted democratic process. . It threatens national security by giving rise to regional cultural challenges to national sovereignty and mutual repression. We can condemn neighboring Sri Lanka and Pakistan for living again instead of taking lessons from their mistakes. India’s national security deserves a functional democratic federal alternative to its passive “quasi-federal” structure, which is neither federal nor democratic but a constitutional “infrastructure”.

Ashwini K. Ray is a former Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.