war in ukraine has encouraged Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to quickly restore ties with his West Asian neighbors so that he is better positioned to meet the serious geopolitical challenges emerging from the conflict.
This process of course-correction began when Israeli President Isaac Herzog visited Turkey on March 9 this year, ending a decade of strained ties, largely due to Turkey’s support for Palestinian interests. The reason was The cordiality created by the visit continues with regular telephone conversations between the leaders of the two countries and indications that Mr. Erdogan may visit Israel soon.
Turkey’s access to Saudi Arabia has been more dramatic, with Mr. Erdogan’s visit on 28-29 April. Prior to the visit, the special prosecutor in Turkey transferred the criminal case against 26 Saudi nationals for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi to the kingdom, thus closing the sensitive and divisive case. Saudi Arabia lifted restrictions on imports of Turkish goods, which reduced Turkish exports from $3.2 billion in 2019 to $200 million last year.
Prior to his departure, Mr. Erdogan spoke of “a joint desire to begin a new period of cooperation”, and in particular mentioned energy, health, food security, finance and the defense industry as sectors moving forward. Did. During the visit, he held cordial meetings with King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and referred to the kingdom as Turkey’s “friend and brother”. In addition to promoting bilateral economic ties, regional commentators have noted the potential for cooperation in promoting regional stability, particularly in matters relating to Syria, Iraq, Egypt and the Eastern Mediterranean.
Turkey’s Strategic Autonomy
Turkey, a NATO member since 1952, under President Erdogan has, as Graham Fuller put it, “for a broad regional leadership, unbearable to any one country or power”. Believing the US to have a hand in a coup attempt against him in July 2016, Mr. Erdogan moved closer to Russia and, contrary to NATO rules, even bought the Russian S-400 missile defense system. Its withdrawal from the NATO project to develop the F-35 fighter has encouraged even greater affinity with Russia.
Russia today provides 52% of Turkey’s gas imports, 65% of its grain requirements, and annually sends seven million tourists who contribute significantly to Turkey’s GDP. Russia is also building a nuclear power station that will meet 30% of Turkey’s energy needs in 2030. Bilateral trade stood at $30 billion last year.
The two countries are also bound by the 930-km-long Turkstream gas pipeline that bypasses Ukraine and connects the two countries to the Black Sea.
Turkey has also forged close ties with Ukraine. The latter provides about 15% of Turkey’s grain imports and sends one million tourists annually to the country. In early February 2022, the two countries signed a free trade agreement and a defense cooperation agreement. The latter provides for the supply and joint production of Turkey’s deadly Bayratkar TB2 unmanned drone that has boosted Ukraine’s combat capabilities in the ongoing conflict with Russia.
On March 29, Turkey hosted the second round of Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Istanbul, amid few signs of progress at that time. Peace talks have stalled since then; Recent reports indicate that Western allies are unwilling to end the conflict quickly. At the same time, Western nations are making efforts to draw Turkey more deeply into their alliance.
So far, Turkey has remained committed to strategic autonomy. It has described the Ukraine conflict as “war” and in the context of the 1936 Montreux Convention, the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits are closed to naval navigation. Mr Erdogan has described the war as “unacceptable”, while Turkish official media criticized the Russian attack. Turkey also co-sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution that “condemned” the Russian aggression. Turkey, however, has refused to join its Western allies in imposing economic sanctions on Russia, nor has it closed its airspace to Russian traffic. It has also not sent any new consignments of weapons to Ukraine.
regional geopolitics
The sinking of the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Moskva, on 14 April, possibly through missile strikes from Ukraine, highlights the strategic importance of the Black Sea. Through its Black Sea Fleet, Russia is eager to project power into the Mediterranean – hence expanding and modernizing its bases in Crimea, Tartus and Hamimim in Syria, and consolidation of its military presence in Libya.
These Russian concerns and ambitions affect Turkey’s interests. So, not surprisingly, they have been on opposite sides over the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, when Turkey backed Azerbaijan against Armenia, a Russian ally, in 2020. Turkey has also opposed Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 on the grounds that Russian control of Crimea and the upgrade of Russian naval capabilities would tilt the maritime balance of power in the latter’s favour.
In response, Turkey has increased its naval power in these waters – in April this year, the “Blue Homeland” naval exercise took place in the Black, Aegean and Mediterranean Seas, involving 122 ships, 41 aircraft and 12,000 personnel. During these war games, Mr. Erdogan pledged to make Turkey “the most powerful naval force in the region”.
Russia’s plan in the Ukraine War to take full control of the Donbass region in eastern Ukraine and the Ukrainian coast on the Black Sea, and then to occupy the Transnistria region on the Ukraine–Moldova border – taken together, would significantly expand Russian influence. and revive the traditional Russo-Ottoman rivalry in the region, when the Ottomans were supported by Western allies, Britain and France.
Turkey’s NATO allies hope that, in the face of the challenge of an expansionist Russia, Turkey will return as an obedient member of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance.
But it seems impossible to do so. Turkey remains uneasy from time to time Western criticisms of Mr. Erdogan’s authoritarian methods. Turkish public opinion is also largely anti-Western. In a survey in January 2022, 39.4% supported closer ties with China and Russia, while 37.5% supported closer ties with the US and the European Union; A year ago, the two figures stood at 27.6% and 40.9%, respectively. Again, from a geopolitical point of view, Turkey sees the need to work closely with Russia to manage its vital interests in Central and West Asia, the Caucasus and Afghanistan.
As the war continues and domestic and regional pressures mount on Mr. Erdogan, the Turkish leader will need to rely on his substantial capacity as a crisis manager to lead his country through these stormy times.
(Talmiz Ahmed is a former diplomat)