Turkey’s foreign policy, the East-West divide

Amidst the intense east-west hostilities emanating from the war in Ukraine, there is one country at the center of regional diplomacy – Turkey. Following earlier ties with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoan met his Prime Minister Yair Lapid on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in September this year and pledged to cooperate with Israel. The bridges have been rebuilt with Shared security and energy interests. And, dramatically, on 19 August, Mr. Erdoan signaled Turkey’s readiness to engage with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, saying “there is no resentment in politics”.

But, despite this sociability, Turkey’s postal fistfight has also been on display. It maintains its tough stance on Sweden’s membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), insisting on the repatriation of Kurdish leaders, described as “terrorists”, to enjoy sanctuary in the Nordic capital. are. And, it maintains its confrontation with Greece, a fellow NATO member.

Grecian churning

Turkey is concerned about the expansion of relations between Greece and the United States; Ankara recently called on ambassadors from both countries to protest the deployment of US military supplies to islands in the Aegean, in violation of several agreements, including those of Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947).

Two other areas of contention are Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean. In early September, the US lifted a ban on defense supplies to Cyprus after the island nation refused refueling and repair facilities to Russian naval ships. Turkey has belligerently announced that it will expand its military presence on the divided island, beyond its current strength of 40,000 troops.

In another stimulus for Greece, in early October, Turkey signed an energy agreement with the Tripoli-based Libyan government for joint exploration of hydrocarbon resources in the eastern Mediterranean. The agreement was signed in the presence of Mr. Erdoan, along with his foreign, defence, energy and trade ministers, indicating Turkey’s broad strategic interests in the region.

Turkey has confirmed that it is the only NATO member that can engage with Russia and that Ukraine can mediate in the war. Turkey successfully negotiated a grain deal with the two warring sides – the first shipment of Ukrainian grain left Odessa on August 1, and within the next month and a half, three million tons were shipped from Ukraine.

Russian-Turkish relations, although marked by significant differences over Armenia, Syria, Libya and the eastern Mediterranean, are substantial and mutually beneficial. They are marked by significant Russian investments and financial transfers to Turkish banks, including a $15 billion transfer from Russia’s nuclear company, Rosatom, to its Turkish partner to purchase equipment needed for the Akkuyu nuclear power plant and to avoid sanctions. . Turkey’s exports to Russia have grown by 75% over the previous year, even as it has emerged as a major importer of Russian energy. Russian President Vladimir Putin has proposed that Turkey become the center of Russian gas supplies to Europe.

Turkey has also indicated its interest in membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): in response to criticisms that it is an anti-West group, Mr. Erdoan has said that Turkey is positioning itself as a “global power”. Is.

global ambitions

Turkey’s diverse diplomatic efforts are puzzling: mired in severe economic woes, with inflation exceeding 80%, and facing a difficult general election in June next year, what prompted Mr. Erdoan from domestic political considerations. or do they have a grand vision for their country?

It is possible that like most populist leaders in a democratic system, Mr. Erdoan sees no contradiction between the two interests. Anti-Kurdish animosity and confrontation with Greece delight the nationalists at home. They are also encouraged by Turkey’s central position in world affairs which is derived from Turkey’s own Ottoman traditions rather than its relations with the West.

Perhaps the best way to understand Mr. Erdoan is to see him as trying to get the most out of Turkey’s geopolitical location at the confluence of Europe and Asia, adjacent to the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Mediterranean and North Africa. and keep this geography in the frame. Ottoman power and influence was at its peak.

On a global scale, Mr. Erdoan has placed Turkey at the center of an east-west divide, drawing benefits from both sides, but not fully committed to either.

Closer to home, he works closely with Russia and Iran, but withdraws from them when Turkey’s vital interests become involved. This explains the military currency of Turkey face to face While maintaining relations with the Kurdish governments in Syria and Iraq, the governments in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Arbil.

In Syria, Mr. Erdoan has nurtured ties with Turkmen and Islamist groups for Russia and Iran, but recent access to Damascus will please both of his regional partners. Similarly, in West Asia, he has become closer to the Arab monarchy, but not at the expense of relations with Iran.

This pattern is being repeated in the Caucasus and the Balkans: in the Azerbaijan–Armenia conflict, Turkey has supported the former, but then worked with Russia to maintain the armistice and improve relations with Armenia. Again, in early September, Mr. Erdogan made a three-day tour of the Balkans to address differences between Bosnia-Herzegovina and its estranged Serb community, followed by a trip to Belgrade and Zagreb to discuss the differences between the erstwhile three successor states. relations can be improved. Yugoslavia

Mr. Erdoan’s foreign policy reflects the skilful use of politics and geopolitics mixed with strong elements of Ottoman glory.

Talmiz Ahmed is a former diplomat