Russia will conduct its first major military exercise since the beginning of its invasion of Ukraine in late August. India’s participation in these multinational exercises raises many questions about its appropriateness, its objectives and its stand on major geopolitical issues of the time.
First, India’s participation in the Vostok-2022 exercises should not be more or less surprising given the fact that India engaged in hand-in-hand military exercises with China for as long as it did. The exercises – the last of which took place in late December 2019 – were clearly designed as a confidence-building measure between the two armies and focused on counter-terrorism and humanitarian aid and disaster relief. India continued these exercises despite regular Chinese incursions into Indian territory, and Beijing regularly blocked India’s efforts to ban Pakistan-based terrorists at the UN Security Council.
In fact, despite Chinese troops occupying the Indian side of the LAC in eastern Ladakh since 2020, Indian and Chinese troops were also part of another Russian multinational military exercise, ZAPD-2021, which also involved Pakistani troops. Meanwhile, October has arrived and it will be India’s turn to host Pakistani troops as part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s anti-terrorism exercise. Meanwhile, with respect to Vostok-2022, India’s involvement creates a further complication, given that one of the training areas is in the southern Kuril Islands, an area claimed by Japan, which is part of the quadrilateral security talks. , is India’s partner in QUAD.
What then is the Indian government signaling internationally if it can practice with the troops of its adversaries and is willing to risk humiliating the declared partners?
Barring the military value of such exercises or what other countries might actually think, New Delhi’s intentions and reasoning should be clear.
One, India is trying to signal to the US-led West that even if India and China are at loggerheads or Russia is criticized and under economic sanctions because of its invasion of Ukraine, they do not. It must be taken that there is room for India’s maneuvers. can be forced. The US and others cannot automatically assume that India will now fly its flag on the mast of the West. This is part of a long-standing post-Cold War Indian strategy, in which External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar noted in his 2019 Ramnath Goenka lecture, “India reached out to engage the US more deeply, then He also did so while protecting his equity. in important areas”.
Second, even from the narrow view of its relations with the West or the liberal democratic global order of which India is a natural part, Russia remains an important partner for New Delhi for sound political reasons. It is so, even though with the US, like India, Moscow has begun to keep its eyes on the side – for example, on occasional talk of improving Russia-Pakistan relations.
India’s civil and military establishment, undoubtedly, remembers the harsh US and Chinese criticism of India’s 1998 nuclear tests, while the Russians softly rebuked and resisted the imposition of economic sanctions. Another sad memory is the idea of the G-2 framework of Washington and Beijing managing the world during the presidency of Barack Obama. For New Delhi, these are not minor deviations from US policy—rather, they suggest that, despite their common democratic identity, the US views India through the cold hard-won prism of its interests. Even now, despite US national security documents describing China as a ‘strategic adversary’ and continuing Chinese provocation, Washington continues to avoid military conflict and/or advocate engagement with Beijing on the basis of economic gain. Influential voices remain.
Third, it makes sense for India to continue working with Moscow as it currently makes economic sense. The Russian decision to offer crude at a discounted rate is smart international politics, a way to undermine Western sanctions imposed after the invasion of Ukraine. And it’s a decision that bodes well for India—the world’s third-largest consumer of crude oil—as it does for China—the world’s second-largest consumer—to Indians regularly at low prices. The energy supply is worth as much as Europeans do.
If the price of keeping the discounts available requires New Delhi to show greater solidarity with Russia by sending some troops to a multinational military exercise, then it will only be possible for India to challenge the West or even become a trusted power. Not a case of working like that, but a common one. Essential understanding to protect your best interests.
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