Whose happiness? On the remarks of the Governor of Kerala

Kerala Governor Arif Mohammad Khan’s indirect threat that he can sack ministers independently is neither in the dignity of his office nor in conformity with the Constitution. He claims that “statements of individual ministers which undermine the dignity of the office of the governor may invite action, including the return of Anand”, have no basis in the constitutional system. Article 164 of the Constitution, which states that the Chief Minister shall be appointed by the Governor and other ministers shall be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister, it states that “Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor”. There have been many instances of governors dismissing chief ministers, but they were related to constitutional situations in which the legislative majority of the existing ministry was in doubt. It has now also been judicially determined that the question of majority can be answered only through a vote of confidence on the floor of the legislature. Nothing in the article means that the Governor can independently dismiss a minister. The Ananda Doctrine exists only in a constitutional sense, and is exercised by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister. In other words, the term ‘Governor’s pleasure’ is used as a euphemism to refer to the power of the Chief Minister to remove a minister from the Council of Ministers.

The context of this particular conflict appears to be the reluctance of the Governor to assent to the Kerala University Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2022. Higher Education Minister R. Bindu’s remark that the Governor should have returned his approval for reconsideration rather than withholding it indefinitely. A possible trigger for his comment. Although governors may vary with the subject matter of a bill and exercise available constitutional options, they should not use their powers to obstruct a law that is unpleasant to them. Within the purview of university laws, the governor, being the Chancellor of most universities, the scope for friction is quite high. It should be remembered that the office of the Chancellor is created by the statute that establishes a university, and the legislature is equally competent to curtail the powers of the Chancellor or to abolish the provision of the Governor being a Chancellor. Even the MM Punchhi Commission, which reviewed centre-state relations, recommended that governors should not burden the role of vice-chancellors. The time has come to apply this principle. Governors seem to have an exaggerated notion of their roles under the Constitution. They are expected to protect the constitution and can use their powers to caution elected regimes against violations of the constitution, but this does not mean that they lack time-limits to make decisions and They can use the discretionary space given to them to work. As a parallel power center.