Why Aadhaar-Voter ID link should be stopped

The Election Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2021 which was hurriedly passed in the winter session in the Lok Sabha, and which facilitates amendments to the Representation of the People Act, is a step towards implementing online-based remote e-voting, The use for which will be the primary identification of Aadhaar. The purpose of linking Aadhaar with Voter ID was to create a biometric dependent voting system from the very beginning. The tall claim made to support this change was to fight “fraud and duplication” in the electoral rolls. At the same time, in practice, in the places where it was used – by mashing voter photo identity card (EPIC) data with surveillance databases – it facilitated selective removal of voters from lists. For example, in the 2018 Telangana Assembly elections, the result of such a measure resulted in the removal of an estimated two million voters.

case of two states

In 2014, the Election Commission of India (ECI) conducted two pilot programs on linking of voter ID with Aadhaar in Nizamabad and Hyderabad districts. Using the claim of effectiveness in weeding out fake voters, the ECI called for a national consultation on Aadhaar and voter ID linking held in Hyderabad in February 2015. ECI launched the National Electoral Roll Correction and Authentication Program (NERPAP) on April 1, 2015. , which was to be completed by August 31, 2015. Following the order of the Supreme Court of India on 11 August 2015, it was announced that this NERPAP would be discontinued. But since Telangana and Andhra Pradesh quickly adopted the program since 2014, the two states have almost completed the task of linking Aadhaar and voter ID for all residents. Although the United State of Andhra Pradesh was bifurcated in 2014, the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) Telangana and Andhra Pradesh had only one office as the bifurcation process was not yet completed in 2015.

database integration

The methodology adopted by ECI to find duplicate voters using Aadhaar is unknown to the general public. Nor is the information available in the public domain. Several applications seeking this information to the Chief Electoral Officer, Telangana under the Right to Information Act are in vain. In 2018, the Election Commission wrote back to the CEO for the methodology used in NERPAP for Aadhaar data collection, after questions were raised about Aadhaar data being collected without voters’ consent. In a letter (No. 1471/Elecs.B/A1/2018-3, April 25, 2018), from CEO Andhra Pradesh (then for Telangana and Andhra Pradesh) to ECI, it is clear that the State Resident Data Hub (SRDH) ) Telangana and Andhra Pradesh government’s application was used to prepare the voter list.

SRDH holds state residents’ data which is supplied by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) or further collected by the state governments. UIDAI initially created SRDH to provide information to states about residents – similar to Aadhaar database without biometrics. Private parties now maintain the SRDH. While UIDAI was mandated not to collect data on caste, religion and other sensitive information data for Aadhaar, it recommended states to collect this information, if necessary, as part of Aadhaar data collection; It termed this process as Know Your Resident (KYR) and Know Your Resident Plus (KYR+).

In Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, the state governments also conducted the state census, where 360-degree profiling was also collected along with details such as voter data, Aadhaar data, caste, religion, bank accounts and other sensitive personal information. These state census surveys were called Samagra Family Survey 2014 and Smart Pulse Survey 2016.

SRDHs are now a part of the state surveillance architecture targeted at the civilian population. These are the SRDH applications that were used by the ECI to narrow down the electoral rolls, resulting in the exclusion of a large number of voters in Telangana in 2018. This is not only in Telangana but all over India; The ECI has already linked Aadhaar and voter ID cards of around 30 crore people, resulting in deletion of voters (Unstarred Question 2673, Rajya Sabha of January 2019).

suffrage

The role of the ECI has been reduced to verify voters by using door-to-door verification (in 2015) (based on RTI replies from ECI), and widely in 2018 after the Telangana Assembly elections in December reported); A software algorithm introduced by the government for purposes unknown to the public and maintained by a private IT company is now under control. While the role and autonomy of the ECI itself is speculative, subjecting the core electoral rolls to surveillance software damages the concept of universal adult suffrage. The experience that has unfolded in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh is voter suppression and denial of franchise.

A mock election (in October 2021) was conducted by the State Election Commission in Telangana with a smartphone using facial recognition, voter ID, Aadhaar number and phone number for authentication during polling (This is the tweet by Collector, Khammam) it was done). This method kills the “secret ballot.” In a situation where the role of money makes a mockery of the democratic process, linking Aadhaar would be pointless. Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs), if foolproof, put an end to the days of booth capturing prevalent in the days of paper ballots. But these expressions are going to bring back the era. E-voting can also be played by using malware to alter the result of the election. Though the bill does not consider e-voting on a large scale, there is an issue of ensuring electoral integrity.

Aadhaar-Voter ID linkage will also help political parties to create voter profiles and influence the voting process. Online trends on polling day and finely targeting voters using their data will make it easier for political parties to access data for elections. A ruling coalition will always have an advantage with the data it has. An example is the Chief Ministers of some states being asked to obtain the data of beneficiaries of welfare schemes. How this data was used in the 2019 elections is an indication. The manner in which Aadhaar has been pushed across the country has been undemocratic and unconstitutional since its inception. Aadhaar itself contains many fake and duplicate names, which have been widely documented. Linking of Aadhaar with Voter ID will create complexities in the voter database which will be difficult to fix. This process will introduce errors in the electoral roll and massively affect India’s electoral democracy.

Kiran Chandra Yarlagadda is the General Secretary of the Free Software Movement of India (FSMI). Srinivas Kodali, Researcher, FSMI