APresident Xi Jinping conducts an online review of the Spring Festival celebrations in China combat preparedness Armed Forces of China. He directed units of the Air Force and Navy to remain alert and stressed the need to be prepared for emergencies. Addressing soldiers at a border station in Xinjiang, he cited them as an example of border defense. Xi also spoke to members of the Liying (Falcon) Squad, an elite commando force tasked with anti-terrorist duties under the People’s Armed Police Force, to inquire about their training. He urged the officers to improve their skills and strictly perform their duties.
While regular interactions occur between members of the political executive in most countries and military branches, the timing of Xi’s interactions with the various sections of forces responsible for China’s internal and external security has been noted by military strategists. 2020 saw China’s worst conflict with India in decades which led to casualties on both sides. India and China are engaged in a prolonged confrontation in the icy Himalayas, with the theater of conflict extending to Arunachal Pradesh, where Indian and Chinese troops clashed in the Tawang sector in December 2022. Xi has launched large-scale exercises and regular patrols in the areas. Such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea are claimed by China. China’s air force has been regularly flying near Taiwan and its war games close to Taiwan’s shores escalated to unprecedented levels after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the island last year.
Apart from external factors, one needs to look carefully at the domestic discourse in China. 2022 was an important year in China’s political calendar as Xi was expected to seek an unprecedented third term in October 2022, bringing a renewed focus on the preparedness of the defense forces.
overhauling the army
Xi, as head of the Central Military Commission (CMC), a key body of the Communist Party of China (CPC) responsible for managing the armed forces, inspected its Joint Operations Command Center in November 2022 . Their Address Warned that the rapidly changing situation posed serious risks to the nation and that the forces should focus their energies on fighting the war, and should accelerate training to enable the People’s Liberation Army to win the war. Earlier addressing the National Defense and Military Reform Symposium in September 2022, Xi stressed that the reform of national defense during his tenure has been a historic achievement as it addressed “structural bottlenecks and institutional issues”. In various stages, Xi has reorganized troop formations and command theatres. China has built up troops’ capability in new frontiers such as space and cyberspace with the formation of a strategic support force. The PLA Rocket Force was upgraded to a full military service branch and is in charge of China’s land-based nuclear and conventional missile forces.
In addition, China’s internal propaganda has painstakingly attempted to highlight Xi’s role in transforming the PLA into a modern force, and has been billed as his signature initiative. CMC vice general Zhang Youxia argued in an article People’s Daily That the defense forces faced risks before Xi took power in 2012 and worked to rebuild the military and purge corrupt generals. Implicit in this claim is that Xi’s predecessors allowed drift in the armed forces, endangering national security. It may be recalled that soon after Xi took office, CMC presidents Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou and other senior military figures were eliminated on the grounds that they were responsible for accepting bribes in exchange for promotions in the armed forces. were. The fall of senior figures in the military establishment has exposed the extent of the unholy practice of buying ranks in the services, which has put a question mark on the combat readiness of one of the world’s largest armies. At a time when Xi has branded the modernization of the PLA as a pet project, he has to constantly push for its preparedness.
Read also: PLA media villainizing India as Xi inspects LAC troops ahead of Chinese New Year
Ukraine-Taiwan Analogy
Since the Ukraine crisis, China has strongly promoted the view that the situation is caused by the US obsession with building coalitions that threaten stability. Comparing the European situation to Asia, an article in PLA Deli Describes the Indo-Pacific strategy as responsible for grouping and therefore endangering peace and stability in Asia. In fact quite the contrary, China’s live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait in response to Pelosi’s visit last year extended to Japan with missiles landing in Japan’s exclusive economic zone. This increased the belief among the Japanese elite that Japan would not be safe in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. As a result of this belief, Japan has promoted security cooperation With America and increasing its defense budget. In the Xi era, China’s internal narrative sought to weaponise historical grievances, particularly Japan’s wartime role in China. In 2014, he announced two National holidays: “War Against Japanese Aggression Victory Day” and “Nanjing Massacre Memorial Day”, and publicly Honored Assassins of Japanese Prime Minister Hirobumi Ito.
To conclude, first, the bribery for promotion scandal will persist in the psyche of China’s political elite despite the PLA’s overhaul, and will continue to cast doubt on its efficacy. Furthermore, the armed forces are still largely unused in combat, having last seen active combat in the Sino-Vietnamese War in the late 1970s. To bridge the gap, China has sought to involve veterans of foreign armies to train its personnel, as revealed by a check Recently launched by the Australian government to highlight China’s offer for its defense personnel. Second, China’s elite view Japan’s security through a prism of history, which has led its strategists to argue that the latter is moving away from its stated pacifism, which has led Xi to call for greater combat readiness of his military. . Given Xi’s belligerence, this is not something the world can ignore.
Kalpit A. Mankikar is a Fellow in the Strategic Studies Program and is based at ORF’s Delhi Center. Thoughts are personal. this article Originally Appeared on the ORF website.