TeaThe Home Ministry is considering a bizarre move to make the Indo-Tibetan Border Police the primary force along the Line of Actual Control with China. Article In The Economic Times, This will remove the army from its frontline position and replace it with ITBP personnel. And in a possible flashpoint, they will be exposed to potentially unequal scenarios of China’s People’s Liberation Army, therefore, potentially further complicating India’s border equation with China.
Several rounds of talks to resolve the issue of Chinese incursions into the Indian side of the LAC have shown no signs of progress, but New Delhi feels it is appropriate to relax the forces deployed to prevent Beijing’s expansion. The already uneven scenario is likely to worsen the situation if the Narendra Modi government finalizes a measure to give priority to the ITBP. and direct cause The reason behind the proposed move is even more ambiguous – ‘to avoid future conflicts between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army of China’. It defies military logic, tactical knowledge of the terrain and the ongoing tense situation since April 2020.
do not see eye to eye
While border management is the responsibility of the MHA, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) is also prepared when the matter of concern is an undefined border. And a large part of India’s cartography consists of boundaries that are still not accepted internationally. The management of these disputed areas is where forces are drawn without full command and control of all national assets to ensure the sanctity of India’s borders. Instead of a cohesive national operational plan managing these boundaries, the perennial issue of arrogance, turf wars, and bureaucratic empire-building remains at the fore.
The war has been an ongoing affair between the MHA-MoD, especially the Assam Rifles and now the ITBP. As India’s oldest counter-insurgency force, the Assam Rifles has been fought by both the ministries for decades. Even as the MHA is the budget ministry for the Assam Rifles and provides police nomenclature for its ranks, the operational control rests with the MoD. Therefore, a serving lieutenant general acts as a director general supported by various military officers of police rank. The MHA wants to take full control of the paramilitary force from the MoD and depute its own personnel to run it. But the operational scenario of the Northeast has ensured better understanding.
Operationally, the same should apply for the ITBP as its primary responsibility overlaps with that of the Army, and has become even more important since the LAC warmed up in 2020 after decades of inaction. there have been many Call To develop advanced Army-ITBP command and coordination by domain experts, but they always have to face the inaction of the Ministry of Home Affairs. So much so that even though both require the same high-altitude equipment, there is no common purchasing mechanism.
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remote command is a problem
It is the Army that exercises overall control over the LAC on the Indian side, monitoring patrols and monitoring key points to keep a check on Chinese activities, and this is the arrangement since the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Not everyone is used to. Undefined boundary scenario. The ITBP was established in October 1962 to guard the border with Tibet and is on the front line of deployment but is not under command and coordination with local military formations. For example, the ITBP’s patrol schedule, though shared with the Army, was always drawn up at North Block, New Delhi. Such remote distance command and control is not a practical situation, especially given the undetermined nature of the border and the potential for conflict with Chinese troops. For effective border management, a local commander must be responsible for all deployed national assets.
Since border line disputes ultimately involve the military, the most effective command and control mechanism would be all other national assets, military, police or other civilian troops, under the coordination of the senior-most local commander. It ensures efficient utilization of workforce and prevents duplication and wastage of national resources. Whatever be the pattern of LAC management has been efficient as the two ministries are barely coordinating with each other in terms of budget and logistics. National intent is evident in how the money is spent – from spending on specialized equipment to spending on daily provisions.
While this duplicates procurement without increasing economy of scale, it also messes up logistics management. The scale of deployment now required in Ladakh, in particular, means duplication of equipment means additional logistical burden. Deploying to high altitudes is a logician’s nightmare, as weather and other factors continue to take a heavy toll on both the workforce and equipment. More effort is required in store-keeping to manage all the specialized equipment drawn from multiple sources. Alternatively, a single command and control ensures that scarce national resources are not wasted on repeated efforts and that wastage due to maintenance costs is avoided.
If the Home Ministry is successful in pushing its case for the ITBP to play a major role along the LAC, it will need a much larger workforce. Apart from lacking the structure and organizational capabilities to deal with conflict situations, the ITBP also does not have the military strength for the increased role. Then raising more battalions of ITBP is a question: Why is the budget constraint imposed only on the recruitment of armed forces with a short-lived Agniveer formula and not the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs)? India clearly feels that the CAPFs are more important for their security than the armed forces, who have always taken their chestnuts out of the fire.
Manvendra Singh is a Congress leader, Editor-in-Chief of Defense and Security Alert and Chairman of Rajasthan Sainik Welfare Advisory Committee. He tweeted @ManvendraJasol. Thoughts are personal.
(Edited by Likes)