The growth of relations between India and the United States is often traced back to their decline 25 years ago, when the US imposed sanctions against India (and Pakistan) after the US tested its nuclear weapons in May 1998. Since then relations between the two have declined. Formed by five US Presidents (Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, Joe Biden) and three Indian Prime Ministers (Atal Bihari Vajpayee), India and the US have evolved year after year, some years more than others In more. Manmohan Singh, Narendra Modi in the first two decades of the 21st century). While the Clinton-Vajpayee-era relationship fostered summit-level diplomacy, the Manmohan-Bush and Manmohan-Obama relations highlighted nuclear diplomacy, and Modi-Obama and Modi-Trump on trade and military diplomacy.
Following his visit to Washington earlier this June, Mr. Modi’s meetings with Mr. Biden during his state visit to Washington have prompted both countries to move forward with technology diplomacy, including transfer of technology (ToT). Including unprecedented new promise. US as a result of the MoU between General Electric (GE) Aerospace and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) “to produce fighter jet engines for the Indian Air Force”.
For India, the rapidly expanding scope of the relationship was seen in 2016 in the context of overcoming what Mr. Modi called the “hesitation of history” and discarding the government’s Cold War ambivalence in Indian foreign policy towards the US Is. More important, however, is the shift in America’s belief in the arc, “American exceptionalism”, to a more pragmatic era of “American exceptionalism for India”. In other words, it is the US decision to make a series of exceptions, especially for India, in the first quarter of this century that is responsible for the big jump in the relationship, touted by Mr. Obama (2009), and Mr. Biden (2023).
civil nuclear deal
In 1998, just six months after the US imposed sanctions on India under the Arms Export Control Act, in November, Mr. Clinton signed a waiver of sanctions on both India and Pakistan. The Bush administration’s push for civilian nuclear waivers resulted in the 2005 Indo-US Joint Statement on waivers under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, the Henry Hyde Act, and the 123 Agreement with India, which also resulted in India-specific waivers. Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008. Obama’s visit to Delhi in 2010 saw a breakthrough in implementing all the exemptions of the previous decade to create another set of exceptions for India on export controls and high technology trade and transfers under US Export Administration Regulations. EAR) and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
The significance of all these exceptions was that they were made despite the fact that India has never joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime; Nor did it sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. More importantly, these were “India-specific” waivers that were not available to other non-NPT countries such as Pakistan, and were important indicators of a shift in US alignment in South Asia.
russian angle
Over the past decade, US exemptions have been on rules dealing with Russia, such as through the 2017 Sanctions Against America’s Adversaries Act (CAATSA). The Trump administration refrained from approving India for the Russian S-400 missile system, but approved Turkey and China for similar purchases. In 2022, the US House of Representatives “passed”[Ro] Khanna Amendment”, which if becomes law, would give India a complete exemption from CAATSA sanctions.
In the wake of the Russian war in Ukraine, the US has ruled out secondary sanctions against India for substantial oil imports from Russia or defense involvement. This is actually an exception, given that Mr. Biden also ordered sanctions on German entities for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in 2022.
Finally, there is the International Religious Freedom Act exemption that the US has given India for the past four years. Despite repeated recommendations by the US Commission on International Religious Freedom to place India on its list of “countries of particular concern”, which includes China, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Myanmar, the State Department has complied not done.
It is pertinent to note that all these exceptions have been made for India, despite its refusal to ever be an ally or coalition partner, and its strong ties with US adversaries such as Russia and Iran.
Exceptions have been made for India withdrawing from groups such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) without accepting the terms of breaking ties with these adversaries, which are part of the US-Europe world order. Challenge for. or any commitment to engage in US military operations against them. And they have been approved, even though so far very few commercial contracts for American companies (nuclear power plants, fighter jets, weapons systems) have been successful.
a perspective
Why has the US institutionalized such a broad-based waiver policy for India over two and a half decades? The first reason is clearly the promise of relations with India: the world’s most populous country, which as a republic has been an inclusive, pluralistic democracy for most of its history, has a record in nuclear non-proliferation. Where there are concerns on these issues, the American calculation is that expressing them is counterproductive. In Mr Obama’s controversial interview to CNN last week, he said he negotiated the Paris climate accord with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Mr Modi despite concerns over “authoritarianism” because of their size. Second, there is India’s attractiveness as an economic market and a military buyer. Third, India’s geography in Asia and its border issues with Beijing may make it a more reliable partner than European allies in responding to China. Fourth, both Mr. Biden and Mr. Modi acknowledged the Indian-American diaspora, which has established itself as a professional, law-abiding, prosperous and problem-free community, and the biggest driver of improved India-US relations. is a supporter.
Paradoxically, one of the biggest challenges to the seamless arc of this relationship lies in the mechanisms used to strengthen it: exceptions made for India, which can be reversed at any time. America’s former close partners, such as Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and even China, today complain about the “instability” of US foreign policy towards them. Second, despite India’s growth story, the relationship remains largely one-directional on issues such as investment, hardware or technology transfer, and thus the US “gives” to a timetable and India “more than the other way around”. have to take”. Decisions taken by the US, for example, the GE-HAL deal took more than 13 years after the US had in principle approved India’s access to high-tech transfers; The next big leaps in high-tech co-generation, the clean energy transition, semiconductor technology and artificial intelligence will also proceed at an unprecedented pace on a case-by-case basis. The geopolitical context of the relationship, driven by a desire to counter China or contain Russia, is also an American construct in origin, and not one pursued by India. What followed would be a giant leap forward in US-India relations, not from exceptions that become the rule, but from changes in the rules themselves, allowing a range of transactions to be equally open to each other’s strategic autonomy between the partners. Will turn into a respectable relationship with.
suhasini.h@thehindu.co.in