India’s nuclear arsenal recently went into a state of sophistication

Let’s start with the meanings of bravery and agni-pi for India’s arsenal readiness position. These two missiles highlight the importance of expanding the repertoire of our nuclear capable missile forces. India also test-fired a hypersonic weapon, which is estimated to travel at a speed of Mach 5 and is designed to dodge missile defense. Hypersonic weapons such as the Shaurya are likely to be highly effective in taking out enemy early radars, stationary military installations such as airbases and command and control (C&C) facilities, although the Shaurya needs some additional tests to establish the credibility of its operational capabilities. may be required.

The Agni-P missile is believed to be capable of delivering multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) or multiple warheads against a single target. This creates an opportunity for India to strengthen nuclear deterrence through obscurity. Many analysts have speculated that Agni-P and Shaurya together represent a change in India’s first-use policy. However, there is no evidence to officially suggest the change; India’s declarative principle is strongly committed to no-first use, even at high readiness levels as the country’s operating currency undergoes a shift. The latter part is increasingly manifesting in India’s ‘canisterisation’ of missiles, not only for long-range missiles such as the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), but also for the Agni-P, which is a short-range ballistic missile. Is. Missile (SRBM).

Canistering missiles enable more rapid deployment, as warheads can be attached to missiles already in place and placed in climate-controlled tubes, launched at short notice, to prevent damage. In addition, canistered missile capabilities give India options for counter-attacks, particularly against Pakistan, according to some analysts, who fear the intensity of strategic instability emerging from India’s missile advances.

Thus, due to India’s confirmed MIRV-based and canistered ballistic missile forces, one ideology holds that India could launch a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan’s nuclear facilities in the heat of the crisis. This approach conveniently overlooks the fact that Pakistan has a larger nuclear arsenal than India and Rawalpindi has refused to adopt a no-first-use policy, although it has been requested several times in the past. it was done. Pakistan also follows a heterogeneous escalation posture that includes the development and deployment of strategic nuclear weapons, but the most serious early use of nuclear weapons in conflict with India, leaving us exposed to stand-off missile attacks. Furthermore, it is misleading to argue that India’s canisterized and MIRV capabilities sow “strategic instability” when it is the result of Pakistan’s search for an offensive posture that includes the strategic use of nuclear weapons against a potential Indian conventional attack.

In fact, Pakistan’s belief that tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons can be set aside is a primary source of instability. New Delhi has generally rejected the notion that reducing tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons is possible or sustainable because at least there is no difference between counter-value and counter-force strikes involving such weapons against Pakistan. There may not be a real difference. Moreover, India’s pursuit of readiness levels as high as the Agni-P and Shaurya is par for the course that it is a fair insurance against a risk-prone adversary like Pakistan. Although India has a no-first-use policy, combining this with the high level of operational readiness of its nuclear missile forces is also about pursuing nuclear deterrence, albeit through obscurity, as it sows uncertainty and Creates caution in India’s two nuclear. Opponents, China and Pakistan. If anything, it complicates Beijing and Rawalpindi’s first strike options.

Beyond Pakistan, advances in India’s missile capabilities are set to intimidate the People’s Republic of China. The latter has much better capabilities than India. Beijing has deployed its Dong-Fang (DF)-26 IRBMs in the Xinjiang region of western China. India’s Shaurya hypersonic weapon is similarly China’s DF-17 Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV), which has a range of 1,800-2,500 km, which Beijing is believed to have been fielding since at least 2019. Despite the caveat that New Delhi has generally rejected distinctions. Between counter-value and counter-force targets and tactical and strategic capabilities, Indian counter-force strike options are more plausible against China than against Pakistan, as the vast majority of former land-based nuclear forces are more distant from population centers. In contrast to China’s geographical and strategic depth, Pakistan is highly vulnerable to strategic constraints due to its narrow geography. In any case, Beijing’s submarine-based nuclear capabilities give it a nearly invulnerable second-strike capability, making India’s countermeasures against Chinese nuclear targets difficult. Thus, India’s hypersonic and canisterized fire SRBM and IRBM capabilities alike are about maintaining strategic deterrence and enhancing regional strategic stability.

Harsh V. Pant and Karthik Bommakanti are Professors of International Relations, King’s College London and a Fellow of the Observer Research Foundation, respectively.