In the 77 years since the end of World War II, both American political parties, American economists, Wall Street, and the Business Roundtable have preached the free market, free trade, and globalization. Indeed, as a counselor to the Secretary of Commerce in the Reagan Administration, I was instructed by the Secretary and the White House to negotiate an end to “Japan’s unfair industrial policies and mercantile trade practices” such as subsidizing its semiconductor industry .
Yet Japan was merely copying the earlier United States.
Jefferson vs Hamilton
At the time of America’s birth, a major debate ensued between Thomas Jefferson, who envisioned a free-trade nation of tutelary farmers, and Alexander Hamilton, eager to spark the Industrial Revolution in Britain as wealth-producing nation. foreshadowed a nation of workers in factories. Fueled by advancing technology.
America’s near defeat in the War of 1812 with Britain, due to its lack of ability to manufacture equipment of war, changed Jefferson’s mind. “Experience has taught me that construction is as essential to our freedom as it is to our comfort,” he said.
In the wake of this change of heart, America became mercantilist with high tariffs on imports and industrial policies that subsidized industrial developments such as Eli Whitney’s interchangeable parts for mass production lines, Robert Fulton’s steamships, and Samuel Morse’s telegraph.
In the midst of the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln raised tariffs on imported steel from Great Britain, the then global low-cost producer, to record levels. In response to critics, Lincoln said: “I don’t know much about tariffs, but I do know that when we buy steel abroad, the foreigner gets money and we get steel, but when we make in America If we buy steel, we will get steel and money.” Shortly thereafter, the US became a low-cost producer due to declining costs, often accompanied by increased production.
During World War II, the US government asked major corporations like General Motors to stop making autos (or whatever else they were making) and start making airplanes and tanks. Wartime economy was the ultimate industrial policy, and it dramatically reduced production costs and resulted in unimaginable technological advances.
Of course, the war was preceded by the Great Depression, which itself was preceded by the eye-watering Smoot-Hawley tariffs on which most leading economists blamed the Depression and even the war.
policy reversal
After the war, America emerged as the dominant global producer in almost every industry. What was needed was no longer a more competitive America, but one that would buy into and invest in rebuilding the rest of the world. The junction of this need with the growing role of professional economists, first dealing with the Great Depression and then with the reorganization of the post-war world, confronted US policy for free trade and globalization from its historic mercantilism.
The rationale for free trade was first defined by the British banker David Ricardo in 1817 when he introduced the notion of comparative advantage. He demonstrated that even if Britain produced wine and cloth less efficiently than Portugal, both countries would still be better off with Britain making all cloth and Portugal all wine because Britain was less bad at making cloth than wine. Was. The concept was similar to a doctor who is a better typist than his assistant but who focuses on doctoring and gets the assistant to type.
Under this comparative advantage concept, they seem to prosper more by focusing on what they do best and trading for the rest. Thus, free trade appears to be a win-win proposition that logically should be adopted by all.
But the key assumptions of the theory and econometric models used to calculate the effects of trade are questionable. For example, the standard Global Trade Analysis Project econometric model assumes perfect competition in which no producer has any measurable influence on market prices or costs. But this is certainly not true in cases such as Boeing and Airbus. The model also assumes that the unit cost of a product is the same whether you make one or a thousand units. In fact, mass production generally leads to falling costs.
The model also assumes that wages are determined by the inherent skills of workers and not by the nature of the companies and industries in which they work. Thus, if you are making $50 an hour working for Ford, it is assumed that if Ford fires you, Walmart will hire you at the same rate of $50.
the only way
[1945सेलेकरहालतकयेसिद्धांतऔरमान्यताएंबाइबलऔरअमेरिकीविश्वविद्यालयोंमेंव्यापारकोकैसेपढ़ायाजाताहैइसेनियंत्रितकरनेवालाकानूनअमेरिकीसरकारद्वाराबातचीतऔरमीडियाद्वारासमझायागयाहै।अमेरिकीअर्थशास्त्रप्रतिष्ठाननेजोरदेकरकहाकिमुक्तव्यापारयहांतककिएकतरफामुक्तव्यापारमुक्तिकाएकमात्रमार्गथा।
फिर, 1 मार्च, 2018 को, इकोनॉमिस्ट पत्रिका की कवर स्टोरी, मुक्त-व्यापार चर्च के पोप ने कहा, “हाउ द वेस्ट गॉट चाइना रॉन्ग।” छह महीने से भी कम समय के बाद, अगस्त में, ट्रम्प प्रशासन ने टैरिफ लगाया चीन से कुछ आयात।
2021 में, कई लोगों का मानना था कि नया बाइडेन प्रशासन उन्हें निरस्त कर देगा। इसके बजाय, यह चिप्स अधिनियम जैसी नीतियों के साथ अलेक्जेंडर हैमिल्टन और अब्राहम लिंकन की नकल करता रहा है।
ऐसा करने में, राष्ट्रपति बिडेन ने न केवल अब तक प्रचलित व्यापार सिद्धांत की अपर्याप्तता, बल्कि नई समस्याओं का भी खुलासा किया है। आपूर्ति-श्रृंखला जोखिम लें। वैश्वीकरण की लंबी, जटिल आपूर्ति श्रृंखलाएं अनिवार्य रूप से छोटे, सरल लोगों की तुलना में बहुत अधिक जोखिम उठाती हैं। कोविड महामारी ने उस जोखिम की कुछ कीमत दिखाई है। इन्हें कभी भी अर्थमितीय मॉडल या निवेश की वित्तीय गणना में शामिल नहीं किया गया था। जोखिम विशेष रूप से बड़ा होता है जब आपूर्ति शृंखला बहुत भिन्न राजनीतिक, कानूनी और दार्शनिक प्रणालियों वाले देशों को जोड़ती है। यदि जोखिम को लागतों में शामिल कर लिया जाए, तो अधिकांश व्यापार रुक जाएगा।
एक अन्य उदाहरण ग्रीनहाउस-गैस उत्सर्जन है। व्यापार में शिपिंग शामिल है जो कुल ग्रीनहाउस गैसों का लगभग 14% उत्पन्न करता है। यह लागत कभी भी उत्पाद या सेवा की कीमत में शामिल नहीं होती है। यदि ऐसा होता, तो बहुत कम व्यापार और अधिक घरेलू उत्पादन होता।
एक और अनिगमित लागत ज़बरदस्ती की है। रूस की प्राकृतिक गैस पर निर्भरता के कारण जर्मनी आज खुद को रूस द्वारा जबरदस्ती के अधीन करने के लिए एक उच्च कीमत चुका रहा है। इसी तरह, कोविड संकट ने चीन पर निर्भरता के लिए अमेरिका की भेद्यता को दिखाया, जिसकी राजनीतिक और दार्शनिक अवधारणाएं मुक्त दुनिया के सीधे विरोध में हैं।
स्पष्ट रूप से, नवशास्त्रीय मुक्त-व्यापार सिद्धांत पर आधारित वैश्वीकरण गलत दांव था और है। हैमिल्टन के पास शुरुआत में ही सही था।
श्री Prestowitz आर्थिक रणनीति संस्थान के संस्थापक और अध्यक्ष हैं। उन्होंने रीगन प्रशासन में वाणिज्य सचिव के परामर्शदाता के रूप में कार्य किया।