Under Modi 2.0, a curriculum-corrected foreign policy

There is a new momentum in India’s foreign policy, a clinical acumen to the design, expression and implementation of its external policy, in a clear departure from the ‘song and dance diplomacy’ that characterized Prime Minister Narendra Modi 1.0’s foreign policy . After wasting several crucial years in the political campaigning of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Prime Minister aboard, there is a shift in India’s engagement with the world today. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) appears to have withdrawn the reins of the country’s foreign policy from the BJP leaders, prioritizing substance over style.

a conciliation policy

If Hindutva ideology and oppressive aggression portrayed New Delhi’s diplomacy towards the region/neighbourhoods during Modi 1.0, then India’s neighborhood policy today with a keen desire, to be careful, well calibrated and well thought out towards most of the region Policy is. Win the neighbors back. For example, during Modi 1.0, relations with Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (as well as attitudes towards the Taliban, until they captured Kabul in August 2021), were complicated by ideological overtones and aggressive policies. interference in the constitution-making process of Kathmandu and the subsequent (undeclared) blockade of Nepal; harassing Bangladeshis with objectionable references; The attempt to be the kingmaker in the Sri Lankan elections stemmed from, among others, an obstinate attitude. Such an ‘either you are with us or against us’ attitude has prompted many of India’s neighbors to choose the latter part of choice, giving China at least some degree of independence in India’s traditional sphere of influence. pass permission can be obtained.

The Sangh Parivar’s keen desire to form a Hindu religious plank with Nepal on the lines of VD Savarkar’s vision – “Kashmiris and the entire region including Nepal, Gomantak, Pondicherry and other French possessions constitutes our national and territorial unit and is consolidated An independent and centralized state” – Mr. Modi’s 2014 visit to the Pashupatinath temple in Nepal, dressed in saffron, a rudraksh garland and no sandalwood paste on his forehead.

Those days are gone, it seems. The manner in which the BJP-led government reached out to the Taliban to remove its previous reservations and expand its reach to the West Asian/Gulf states is remarkable. India’s New Nepal policy is devoid of Hindutva fantasies and diplomatic tyranny, and friendly access to both Bangladesh and Sri Lanka is already yielding results. If indeed ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ do not become an issue in the upcoming elections in India, the recent warmth emanating from the golden jubilee celebrations of Bangladesh’s liberation from Pakistan (with Indian help) could further cement ties. The interests of India’s foreign policy should not be allowed to become a slave to the domestic political ambitions of the BJP.

effective multilateralism

New Delhi’s multilateral engagements have also become more results-driven and interest-based, which appears to be proceeding without getting caught up in holy-to-nonsense rhetoric. India’s membership and presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) saw some firm positions from the country. New Delhi’s competent determination of the world body’s response to the crisis in Afghanistan (particularly when India was chairing the UNSC) was accompanied by an outreach to the Taliban, at a time when much of the world struggles to make up its mind on how to deal. Had been. With Taliban 2.0, was remarkable. India’s stronger participation in the global climate change talks in the Quad (India, Australia, Japan and the US) and Glasgow, while at the same time pushing back efforts to secure climate change at the UNSC, also signals that it is ready Be a responsible stakeholder in global/regional governance forums. The transition of the Modi government from political rhetoric to purposeful action is clear.

balancing the contrasts

For a country like India, which lies in an unfriendly neighborhood and is caught between the great power competition between the United States, Russia and China, balancing the various geopolitical contradictions is not easy. New Delhi’s foreign policy has recently demonstrated considerable agility and flexibility in managing those contradictions, as far as possible. consider the following. New Delhi plays up a complex balancing act between Russia and the United States at a time when India is closer to the US than ever in its history, oozing diplomatic shrewdness and sophistication. Buying the S-400 missile system from Russia while risking potential sanctions from Washington, and strengthening its participation in the Quad despite Moscow’s tough words shows the ability to smart-balance systemic contradictions.

Even in the wider West Asian region, New Delhi’s balancing act has been remarkable: between the Arab states and Israel, Israel and Iran, Iran and the Gulf states, and Iran and the US. Of them all, Iran appears to be the weakest link west of New Delhi. The Asian balance works, but that’s a different story. The arrival of the West Asian Quad consisting of the US, India, the United Arab Emirates and Israel is yet another sign of new foreign policy ingenuity in New Delhi. However, on the other hand, the question is whether New Delhi can fulfill all these promising partnerships given the acute shortage of staff in the Ministry of External Affairs. If New Delhi wants to be the shaping force of the system, it must have more men and women to do its job.

India’s relations with China have also seen a certain amount of careful balance. Despite the military standoff at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), bilateral trade has only increased: India-China trade, for example, grew by a record 62.7% in the first half of 2021. New Delhi has also been able to include the China-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization, even as it strengthens its participation in the Quad.

Realities of Geoeconomics

Modi 2.0 also appears to have realized the folly of opposing global and regional economic integration. Mr. Modi’s first term displayed considerable skepticism towards free trade agreements (FTAs). When Mr. Modi took office in 2014, his government also announced that it would review all existing FTAs ​​to see if they were helpful to the country. What followed was the indifferent Indian attitude towards FTAs. In 2019, India decided not to be a part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The only FTA signed by the Modi government in the last seven years was with ASEAN in 2015, though most of the work for this was done by the Manmohan Singh government.

Comment | India’s Foreign Relations and History Section

However, today the government appears to be reconsidering the usefulness of FTAs. New Delhi is scheduled to start FTA talks with the United Kingdom and Canada in 2022 and may begin discussions with Gulf Cooperation Council countries on the possibility of another. It may finalize an FTA with the UAE in 2022. And it comes in the wake of the government’s decision to restart long-suspended talks with the European Union for a comprehensive trade and investment treaty.

The Modi government seems to have realized that its desire to make India a $5 trillion economy (from the current $3 trillion) by 2024-25 will remain a fantasy unless it negotiates, among other things, trade agreements. not be able to actively pursue

Comment | Redefining India’s foreign policy priorities

In short, it appears that New Delhi has realized that the pursuit of national interest is a serious business and must go beyond promoting ideological tendencies and personality defects. A rebooted Indian foreign policy will have to find ways to envision a new regionalism, with or without the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and abandon its obsession with Pakistan and terrorism. Pakistan or terrorism pose no potential threat to India and neither should New Delhi spend a lot of diplomatic capital on them. After all, you are also defined by your passion.

Happyman Jacob teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and is the founder of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research